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CH AMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 
Dear Chief, 
- -
.:§u:p-rtmt {!Jcnrl cf tltt 'J,ltmttb- .:§taftg 
'j'a$lp.ttghtn. ~ - C!f. 2.cJ.;rJ.1.~ 
January 22, 198 3 
No. A-63 8 Barefoot v . Estelle 
I have now reviewed (i) the Application for a 
Stay; (ii) the Response of the State; (iii) the decision of 
CA5 denying a stay; and (iv) the decision of the DC denying 
federal habeas relief. 
Also I have re-read Byron's helpful summary memo 
of J anua ry 21, and the pool memo on this case when it was 
here in 1980--a memo that focused on the hypothetical ques-
tion and answers that are the principal ground relied upon 
then and now by petitioner. 
The l ~ degree of certainty expressed by 
the state's psychiatrist and psychologist seems unI?!" ofes-
sio~ ect . Yet, at the federal habeas corpus hear -
ing, the psychiatrist and psychologist who testified for the 
petitioner, basing their testimony on the same hypothetical , 
agreed to the extent of 90% with the state's witnesse s. 
None of these experts personally examined the petitioner , 
though this was an option open to the petitioner with hi s 
witnesses. Moreover , at this hearing different experts for 
the state--also basing their testimony on the hypothetical--
agreed generally with the predictive judgment of future dan-
gerousness . 
Petitioner's challenge to this testimony is not 
frivolous. It has been considered and rejected, however, by 
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals four times, and by the 
DC and the CA5 in this habeas proceeding. 
In sum, I cannot say that the application for a 
stay now presents a substantial question meriting further 
judicial review. Accordingly, I would deny the application. 
The Chief Justice 





JUSTICE SANDRA DAY o'coNNOR 
-
~nt1rtmt C!Janrt .er£ iftt 'J!inittb .§taft.5 
Jlrurftingtan. ~- C!J. 2!lffe)l.~ 
January 22, 1983 
Re: Barefoot v. Estelle, A-638 
Dear Chief, 
I have reviewed the application and the response and 
vote to deny the application for a stay. 
Sincerely, 
cc: The Conference 
... ~ 
• CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE W>< . J . BRENNAN, JR . 
- -
.:§uprnm ~curl cf flrt ~b .:§taftg 
J)'u~ gl. QJ. 20.;iJ!., 
January 24, 1983 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
RE: No. 82-6080 Barefoot v. Estelle 
Th~ enclosed form of Order was prepared with the help of 
Al Stevas and Frank Lorson. Al advised me that he will inform 
the parties that the case will be set for argument in the April 
session and that the briefing schedule will be tailored accord-
ingly. I suggest that returns might be made to me at your 
earliest convenience. 
I've undertaken to have the Chief Justice and Justice White 
informed. 
/) 
/ ,/ ' 
: ~ . i 
, -..,;,{,.,,~ {. 
W.J,B. Jr. 
• 




Execution Date: January 25, 1983 
Stay Denied by CA5 
(Randall, Reavley & Jolly) 
v. 
ESTELLE 
_ ~ • round: Barefoot was convicted of capital , 
er and sentenced to death on Nov. 14, 1978. The conviction 
was affirmed by the Texas Ct. of Crim. Appeals, 596 S.W. 2d 875 
(1980). Following a hold for Estelle v. Smith, cert was denied. 
453 U.S. 913 (1981), with all Justices voting to deny except 
Justices Brennan and Marshall, who filed their standard capital 
case dissent. 
Barefoot sought and was denied state habeas relief on Oct. 
6, 1981; review was denied by the TX.Ct.Crim.App the same day. 
Barefoot did not seek review in this Court. There were 
apparently two other attempts to obtain state habeas relief. A 
petition for federal habeas was filed. On October 9, 1981 a stay 
of execution was granted by the DC. Following a hearing, the DC 
denied habeas relief on November 12, 1982. The DC and vacated 
its stay on Dec. 8, 1982 and issued a certificate of probable 
cause on Dec. 13, 1982. Barefoot had noticed an appeal to CA5 on 
Nov. 24, 1982. Following briefing and oral argument, CA5, in a 
• 
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16 page opinion, denied the stay on Jan. 20, 1983, but did not 
dispose of the appeal. 
Facts: The evidence at Barefoot's trial established that 
during the summer of 1978 he lived in a trailer with four other 
persons. Barefoot asked one of his roomates, Tiller, for a gun 
and stated that he intended to kill a policeman who had 
mistreated him during an arrest. On August 6, 1978, Barefoot 
told Tiller that he was going to commit a robbery after creating 
a diversion by setting a building on fire and that he would kil 
anyone who recognized him. At 4:30 a.m. on August 7th Barefoot, 
who was wearing a white T-shirt and bluejeans and was armed with 
a .25 caliber pistol and a home-made bomb, awoke another roomate, 
Roberson, and asked to be driven to Harker Heights. On the way, 
Barefoot told Roberson that he was going to blow up a particular 
night club. The two stopped at a store where Barefoot filled a 
plastic milk container with gasoline. Roberson dropped Barefoot 
off near the night club at 5:00 a.m. 
At about 5:15 a witness, Edwards, saw the night club in 
flames and later identified a man standing in the parking lot as 
Barefoot. Edwards drove to the nearby police station and 
returned to the night club. Edwards again saw Barefoot at an 
intersection some distance from the club. Edwards told a police 
officer, Levin, what he had seen and the officer departed to the 
location where Barefoot had been seen last. 
Another witness, Thrash, as he was walking to work, saw a 
police patrol car parked at an intersection with its emergency 




man wearing a white T-shirt and bluejeans step out of some 
bushes, walk toward the officer, shoot the officer in the head at 
point-blank range, and run away. Yet another w_itness, Richards, 
heard the shot, looked out the window and saw a man wearing a 
white T-shirt running away. Richards testified that the man 
resembled Barefoot. 
At 10:30 the same morning, Tiller (roommate) received a call 
from Barefoot. Barefoot asked if Tiller had listened to the 
news. Tiller said yes and asked if Barefoot had done "that." 
Barefoot replied: "yeah, I shot him. I killed them ____ f __ _ 
• I shot him in the head." Tiller called the police. 
Meanwhile, Barefoot returned home. Roberson testified that 
Barefoot was still dressed in a white T-shirt and bluejeans, but 
that the T-shirt now had red blotches on it which appeared to be 
blood. After being told that the police were looking for him 
Barefoot said that he had to get out of town because he "wasted a 
cop." 
Barefoot spent the rest of the day and the night of August 7 
with one Hernandez. After hearing a newscast, Barefoot told 
Hernandez that he was the one the police sought but that he had 
not killed the policeman. Acting on information supplied by 
Hernandez, the police arrested Barefoot at a bus station in 
Houston. The police found the .25 caliber pistol, which later 
proved to be the murder weapon, in Barefoot's pocket at the time 
of arrest. Barefoot was found guilty of a capital offense: 
murder of a peace officer who was acting in the lawful discharge 
of an official duty who the person knew to be a peace officer. 
• 
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At the punishment stage of the trial, two psychiatrists were 
called by the State (Holbrook and Grigson). Both doctors were 
given a "hypothetical" fact situation based on the evidence in 
the case and were asked if the person described would probably 
commit future acts of violence that would constitute a continuing 
threat to society. The detailed nature of the hypothetical is 
discussed in the pool memo to 80-5320. The opinion of both 
doctors was that the person would commit such future acts. The 
State also presented at least 12 witnesses who testified that 
they knew Barefoot's reputation as a law-abiding citizen and that 
the reputation was bad. The jury returned positive answers to 
the three questions required by the Texas Code of Crim. Pro. 
article 37.07l(b): "(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that 
caused the death of the deceased was committed deliberately and 
with the reasonable expectation that the death of the deceased or 
another would result; (2) whether there is a probability that the 
defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would 
constitute a continuing threat to society; and (3) if raised by 
the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the 
deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, 
by the deceased." Barefoot was sentenced to death. 
Direct Appeal: Barefoot raised a number of issues on direct 
appeal. Barefoot claimed that the trial court erred by: failing 
to give a circumstantial evidence charge at the guilt-innocence 
stage; denying a motion for change of venue; overruling 
challenges for cause of three prospective jurors; refusing 
additional peremptory challenges; admitting evidence of 
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extraneous offenses; failing to define "probability;" and 
overruling objections to psychiatric testimony. Barefoot also 
challenged Article 37.071 as unconstitutionally vague. 
Relevant here are the challenges to the psychiatric 
testimony. Barefoot claimed that the doctors were not qualified 
to give an opinion as to his future conduct because they had not 
examined him. He also argued that psychiatrists in general are 
not qualified by education or training to predict future 
behavior. Although acknowledging that the ability to predict 
future dangerousness is subject to debate, the Ct of Crim Appeals 
relied on its prior decisions to find that the trial court may 
admit for whatever value it may have psychiatric testimony 
concerning future behavior. The ct also found that "the use of 
hypothetical questions in the examination of expert witnesses is 
a well established practice," and that the fact that the experts 
had not examined Barefoot went "to the weight of their testimony, 
not to its admissibility." Counsel presenting the hypothetical 
may assume the facts in accordance with his theory of the case. 
The opponent may secure the expert's opinion on a different set 
of facts during cross-examination. The ct also rejected 
Barefoot's claim that the doctors could not express an opinion on 
the probability of future dangerousness because it amounted to a 
legal conclusion. 
Barefoot's conviction and sentence were affirmed. One judge 
dissented in part because he felt that the admission of evidence 
concerning a prior conviction was more prejudicial than it was 




The DC decision Barefoot raised an ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim based on a claim that one juror was excluded in 
violation of Witherspoon and that his counsel failed to object, 
that his attorney did not understand Witherspoon, and that his 
attorney permitted voir dire to be conducted in a manner that 
violated Due Process. He also claimed that article 37.071 was 
unconstitutional because it contains no provisions directing the 
jury's discretion and, relevant here, that the use of 
hypothetical questions to psychiatrist during the penalty phase 
violated Due Process. 
The DC found the channeling of discretion claim settled by 
Jurek v. Texas, and the ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
frivolous. 
On the use of psychiatric testimony claim, the DC found that 
Jurek v. Texas and Estelle v. Smith implied approval of such use. 
~
(The DC's reasoning is essentially the same as the CA's, 
discussed below). The DC also found that the "majority of 
psychiatric experts agree that where there is a pattern of 
repetitive assaultive and violent conduct, the accuracy of 
psychiatric predictions of future dangerousness dramatically 
rises." The DC found that Barefoot's claim really concerned the 
degree of certainty expressed by the psychiatrists at his trial. 
The differences among experts, the DC found, were quantitative 
not qualitative and go to the weight, not the admissibility, of 
the evidence. Petr was not hampered in his cross-examination of 
the doctors nor precluded from presenting testimony concerning 





The CA denial of a stay. The CA addresses three issues in 
its opinion: (1) the weight to be give the DC's grant of the 
certificate of probable cause, (2) the merits of Barefoots claim 
that admission of the psychiatrists' testimony violated due 
process, and (3) the merits of Barefoots claim concerning new 
evidence. 
The CA notes that the TX Ct. of Crim. Appeals has reviewed 
the conviction 4 times (direct appeal and 3 collateral attacks), 
this Court has reviewed it once, and the federal DC once. The CA 
stated that Barefoot's counsel "was allowed unlimited time to 
discuss any matter germane to the decision" at oral argument 
before the CA. The CA found it was its duty to deny the stay if 
"after all these years of study, no constitutional imperfections ------------ ~-of substance can be found." Slip at 3. 
The CA noted the disposition of the Brooks case under 
similar circumstances and the dissent of Justices Brennan, 
Marshall and Stevens. The CA found its handling of this case 
entirely distinguishable from Nowakowski v. Maroney, 386 U.S. 542 
(1967) (per curiam), and Garrison v. Patterson, 391 U.S. 464 
(1968) {per curiam). Neither of those cases dealt with a 
situation where the party had an opportunity to brief and argue 
the merits of the underlying issues and they do not suggest that 
the stay procedure contained in Rule 8, Fed.R.App.P, is abrogated 
by the granting of a certificate of probable cause. The CA found 
the case controlled by Carafas v. Lavallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968), 
rather than Nowakowski or Garrison. Carafas reversed CA2's 




entered by the Court of Appeals ••• indicate[d] that the appeal 
was duly considered on its merits as Nowakowski requires in cases 
where a certificate of probable cause has been 9ranted." Id., at 
242. Carafas goes on to say that "Nowakowski does not 
necessarily require that the [CA] give the parties full 
opportunity to submit briefs and argument in an appeal which, 
despite the issuance of the certificate of probable cause, is 
frivolous, enough must appear to demonstrate the basis for the 
court's summary action." Ibid. 
The CA found that, in accordance with Carafas, 
had been afforded an "unlimited opportunity to make their 
contentions upon the underlying merits by briefs and oral 
argument." 
On the merits, Barefoot claimed that the opinion testimony 
of the two psychiatrists is so unreliable that its admission 
violates due process. Barefoot relied primarily on Green v. 
Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979) {per curiam) and Gardner v. Florida, 
430 U.S. 349 (1977) (joint opinion), for the proposition that the 
Due Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment limit the types of 
evidence that may be presented at a sentencing hearing. 
Gardner concerned the propriety of the trial judge's use of 
a presentence report that was not disclosed to defendant or his 
counsel to determine whether the death penalty should be imposed. 
The CA found that the opinions of the Court "reflect a concern 
not for a specific evidentiary rule, but for the nature of the 
adversary system and the need for the accused and his counsel to 
be able to respond to this evidence." Slip at 8. Green involved 
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the exclusion of testimony during the penalty phase concerning an 
inculpatory statement made by a compatriot of a capital defendant 
that would tend to support the defendant's claim that he was not 
present at the time of the murder. The Court held that, under 
the facts of that case, the exclusion of the testimony violated 
due process even though the testimony could properly be excluded 
under the State's hearsay rules. The evidence was "highly 
relevant to a critical issue in the punishment phase of the trial 
••• and substantial reasons existed to assume its reliability." 
442 U.S., at 97. The CA found Green limited to its facts and 
that it indicated only that certain egregious evidentiary errors 
may be redressed by the Due Process Clause. 
The CA also thought that this Court, by implication, has 
approved use of psychiatric testimony. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 
262 (1976), rejected the argument that a requiring a jury to 
predict future behavior was vague. The Court found it important 
that the jury have all possible relevant information about the 
defendant. The CA found psychiatric testimony "would clearly 
appear to be relevant." Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981), 
also provided support in the CA's view. There the Court noted 
that Jurek did not disapprove the use of psychiatric testimony on 
the issue of future dangersouness but recognized that the future 
dangerousness finding does not require resort to medical experts. 
Smith held that a defendant could not be compelled to submit to a 
psychiatric interview. If the CA were to hold that a 
psychiatrist could not testify on the basis of hypotheticals, it 
would give the defendant "the right to prevent any and all 
• 
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psychiatric testimony on the issue of dangerousness," except that 
in his favor. Such a holding would be inconsistent with Jurek's 
statement that juries should have all relevant information. The 
Court's statements in Smith that the State need not resort to 
medical testimony indicates that the testimony of lay persons 
would be admissible. A holding that doctors' testimony on the 
issue was inherently unreliable would mean that the testimony of 
lay persons would be even more unreliable. 
The CA next addressed Barefoot's claim that the state court 
was without jurisdiction to set an execution date while the 
habeas appeal was pending. The CA found no merit in the 
argument; it is a state law issue that cannot be addressed on 
federal habeas. Barefoot also argued that if the state court had 
no jurisdiction then he was denied Equal Protection because Texas 
courts are closed to him. The CA rejected this argument finding 
federal abstention in habeas cases "a rule of judicial efficienc 
which merely prevents the petitioner from litigating the same 
habeas issue in two forums at the same time." The rule was 
inapplicable because setting an execution date is not a habeas 
suit. 
The CA next addressed Barefoot's claim concerning newly 
disclovered evidence. The witness Richards who testified that 
she had had seen a man in a white T-shirt who resembled Barefoot 
running from the murder scene now states that the man she saw 
could not have been Barefoot because the hair, height and build 
of the two men differed. She now states that she told everyone 
who interrogated here about the dissimilarities, but that the 
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D.A. frightened her into giving false testimony by telling here 
that Barefoot intended to kill everyone in her office. The CA 
found it "difficult" to accept Richards new statement. No 
rational prosecutor would have called her as a witness. The CA 
also noted an inconsistency in the testimony Richards gave at 
trial. She heard two shots and it was undisputed that only one 
was fired. 
The CA also found that Richards' testimony "cannot and could 
not affect the determination of Barefoot's guilt." Slip at 14. 
The CA reviewed the trial evidence and found that even if the 
prosecutor deliberately frightened her to get her testimony "a 
reversal of the conviction would not be justified ••• the omitted 
evidence could not create a reasonable doubt of Barefoot's guilt, 
and the alleged prosecutorial conduct could not have an effect on 
the trial." United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976). 
The CA stated that "finding no patent substantial merit, or 
semblance thereof, to petitioner's constitutional objections, we 
must conclude and order that the motion for say should be 
DENIED." 
Application for stay The application is expected to arrive 
about 12:30 today. 
State's response The State notes that Barefoot is not 
automatically entitled to a stay under Brooks and agrees that "if 
he can demonstrate a reasonable judicial doubt about the outcome 
of any of the issues he would present during his full appeal" he 
is entitled to a stay. There is no doubt about the outcome in 
this case. 
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The State first argues that the CA correctly determined that 
the claim concerning the jurisdiction of the state court to set 
an execution date and the abstention claim. The State relies on 
the findings of the DC and the opinion of the CA on the claims 
concerning psychiatric testimony. 
On the newly discovered evidence claim, the State notes that 
Barefoot raised it for the first time before the CA and agrees 
with the CA's disposition of the issue. 
On Jan. 20, 1983, the State was informed by the Clerk's 
office of the USDC WD TX that Barefoot intends to file a new 
federal habeas petn today. The DC has set the matter for an 
evidentiary hearing on January 24, 1983 (Monday). The State 
argues that any factual dispute concerning the newly discovered 
evidence can be determined at that time if Barefoot re-raises the 
issue. If that DC entertains a reasonable doubt as to the 
matter, that judge will be in the best position to determine 
whether a stay should be granted. 
Discussion Brooks settled the question whether a 
certificate of probable cause requires that a stay be granted. 
The CA has given the parties an adequate opportunity to address 
the merits and has extensively stated its reasons for denying the 
stay. 
That leaves the issue of the psychiatric testimony that is 
the focus of the application for stay which has now arrived and 




To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Rives 
Re: No. A-638, Barefoot v. Estelle 
The issue raised in Justice Brennan's memorandum seems 
legitimate. If the Court can settle on procedures, embodied in the 
form of clear rules, that ensure fair review of death sentences, 
then the pressure on both the lower courts and this Court to make 
difficult choices in a minimum of time might be alleviated. 
The concern that must underlie the memorandum is not that 
the petitioner has not had considerable process below but that he 
-has not had the opportunity to pursue the federal habeas 
proceedings--a DC hearing and appellate review--that are available 
to other habeas petitioners. Whether the petr has such a right is a 
difficult question. As a practical matter, it is difficult to 
overlook the number of pool memos that find numerous sentencing 
errors in cases on direct appeal from state court. More often than 
not, these cases are not cert worthy because they involve 
application of settled law to the particular facts of the case and 
the memo recommends that the errors be left to federal habeas. 
Ideally, there should be no need to resort to federal habeas, but it 
seems that states often have had difficulty in applying the 




difficulty may arise either from unfamiliarity with the procedures 
or the fact that the state courts, when confronted with the nature 
of the crime, have found it hard to adhere to the procedural 
safeguards that this Court has said are essential to the 
constitutionality of the death penalty. 
2. 
If this is an accurate assumption, then there is some 
pressure to ensure that the capital defendants have their federal 
claims reviewed by federal judges. It might be possible to say as a 
matter of federal supervisory power that a petr seeking federal 
habeas review will be entitled to one trip through the federal 
~ ~---....__ - - ----------------
habeas system. This would encourage a petr to bring all his 
- --------
meritorious claims in his first petn. It perhaps would defuse the 
pressure on both the CAs and this Court of having to deal with 
difficult issues in a short space of time. Habeas petns from the 
CAs in capital cases could be dealt with under the Court's normal 
------- --------· ......____. - - ......___ -...___ '-- '---- - -----.......-- -----~
certiorari procedures, which would allow the Court to make ----------- ---considered judgments. If a petr does not prevail on federal habeas, 
then these capital cases could be treated no differently than any 
other case. A stay will be granted only when there is a possibility 
of granting cert on the issue presented. 
-
Barefoot v. Estelle 
No. A-638 
On Application for Stay 
January 24, 1983 
Memorandum of JUSTICE BRENNAN. 
-
We have before us an application for a stay of an execution 
scheduled to take place on Tuesday, January 25, 1983. Petitioner 
applies for a stay of execution pending filing in and d~sposition 
by this Court of a petition for certiorari to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, presenting the question 
of "the appropriate standard for granting or denying a stay of 
execution when a death-sentenced federal habeas corpus petitioner 
presents a constitutional issue of first impression to a federal 
court of appeals." Application for Stay, at 2. 
I adhere to my view that the death penalty is in all 
circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 
227 (1976), and I would grant the application and vacate 
petitioner's sentence of death for that reason alone. 
Independently of that view, however, I believe that a petition 
for certiorari presenting the question proposed by petitioner 
should be granted. The question of the proper standard ior 
granting stays in death penalty cases involves fundamental issues 
• 
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of orderly judicial process which this Court has never addressed 
and about which the lower federal courts have differed. It 
merits the kind of consideration that full briefing and oral 
argument would provide. Therefore, I would also grant the stay 
pending receipt and disposition of a petition for certiorari, or, 
in the alternative, I would treat the application before us as a 
petition for certiorari on this issue, see Brooks v. Estelle, 
U.S. (1982) (per curiam), and grant it. 1 
I 
For the second time in as many months, this Court is faced 
with an application for a stay of execution in a case pending on 
appeal before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit. See Brooks v. Estelle, U.S. <1982). Both this 
case and Brooks involve a decision by the Court of Appeals to 
deny an application for a stay aodressed to it, despite the fact 
that in both cases the District Court had issued a certificate of 
probable cause to appeal, see 28 U.S.C. S2253, and an appeal had 
in fact been docketed. 
In its opinion denying a stav in this case, the Court of 
Appeals states the following legal standards: 
"This court may interfere with the action of the 
State of Texas only upon a showing that the 
Constitution of the United States has been violated. 
Upon the question of whether to stay execution until 
the appeal has been processed, we consider the 
likelihood of success of that appeal. Ruiz v. Estelle, 
666 F.2d 555 (CA5 1981). There should be a substantial 
1since the Court of Appeals' decision denying a stay is 
obviously a final resolution of the case, this Court has 
jurisdiction to review it on writ of certiorari. 
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case on the merits of any serious legal question 
involved in the appeal to warrant staying the decision 
below. Ruiz v. Estelle, 666 F.2d 854, 857 (CA5 1982)." 
Barefoot-v-:-Estelle, No. 82-1680 (CA5 Jan. 20, 1983), 
at 3. 
At the close of its opinion, the court concludes: 
"This Court has had · the benefit of the full trial 
court record except for a few exhibits unimportant to 
our considerations. We have read the arguments and 
materials filed by the parties. The petitioner is 
represented here, as he has been throughout the habeas 
corpus proceedings in state and federal courts, by~ 
competent attorney experienced in this area of the law. 
We have heard full arguments in open court. Finding no 
patent substantial merit, or semblance thereof, to 
petitioner's constitutional objections, we must 
conclude and order that the motion for stay should be 
DENIED." Id., at 16. 
The Court of Appeals denied petitioner's stay application 
less than a week after the application was filed, and less than 
three days after scheduling the application for oral argument. 
Necessarily, briefing on the merits of the appeal underlying the 
s¼ay application was limited. Petitioner--who has never delayed 
in presenting his claims to federal and state forums--had less 
than two weeks in all to prepare and present his application to 
the Court of Appeals. 2 
2Petitioner Thomas Barefoot was convicted of murdering a 
policeman. After the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed 
his conviction, Barefoot v. State, 596 S.W.2d 875 (1980), and 
this Court denied certiorari, 453 U.S. 913 (1981), petitioner was 
sentenced to be executed on October 16, 1981. After exhausting 
his state collateral remedies, petitioner applied for federal 
habeas corpus, and his execution was stayed on October 9, 1981. 
The United States District Court held an evidentiary hearing on 
petitioner's habeas claim and finally denied it thirteen months 
later in November 1982. The District Court issued petitioner a 
certificate of probable cause to appeal the denial of his habeas 
petition, see 28 U.S.C. §2253, and petitioner promptly noticed 






A brief examination of the question presented by 
petitioner's appeal below demonstrates that his appeal is far 
from frivolous, and therefore that the phrases used by the Court 
of Appeals--"a substantial case on the merits" and "patent 
substantial merit"--refer to some quality beyond mere non-
frivolity. Petitioner claimed that conclusory testimony at the 
penalty phase of his trial by a psychiatrist 3 who had never 
examined him, but who merely responded to a long, argumentative 
hypothetical question put to him by the State, violated 
petitioner's rights to due process and freedom from cruel and 
unusual punishmert under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 4 The District Court rejected petitioner's claim 
his appeal. 
On the State's motion, the District Court lifted its stay on 
. December 8, 1982, whereupon on December 20 a state court 
- sentenced petitioner to be executed on January 25, 1983. - -
Petitioner immediately sought state habeas corpus relief on the 
ground that the state court had no jurisdiction to set an 
execution date. On January 7, 1983, he was informed that the 
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals had denied him relief, and a 
second motion for relief was denied on January 11. He then 
applied to the United States Court of Appeals for a stay of 
execution pending resolution of his pending appeal in that court. 
On the afternoon of Monday, January 17, the Court of Appeals 
scheduled oral argument on the stav for the morning of January 
19. The Court of Appeals heard oral argument and issued a 16-
page typewritten opinion denying the stay early on the afternoon 
of January 20. The application to this Court followed. 
3The psychiatrist whose testimony is at issue in this case, 
Dr. Grigson, is the same psychiatrist involved in Estelle v. 
Smith, 451 U.S. 455 (1981). 
4JUSTICE MARSHALL'S dissent describes the merits of 
petitioner's claims in more detail. 
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after an evidentiary hearing, and the Court of Appeals addressed 
it on its merits in its opinion denying a stay. Yet neither the 
District Court nor the Court of Appeals identified prior 
controlling precedents from this Court, the Fifth Circuit, or any 
other Circuit on the issue. Instead, it appears that other 
District Courts within the Fifth Circuit itself 5 , as well as at 
least one state supreme court 6 have reached contrary 
determinations. Read closely, the Court of Appeals' 
determination on the merits in this case rests entirely on its 
statement that "the Supreme Court has, by implication at least, 
approved of psychiatric testimony in cases such as these." Id., 
at 9. 7 
The fact that the Court of Appeals has declined to issue a 
stay with knowledge that petitioner will be executed before it 
can give full consideration to his appeal on the issue described 
5Petitioner's application cites White v. Estelle, Civ. A. No. 
H-81-1661 (SD Tex Dec. 30, 1982), and Gholson v. Estelle, Civ. 
A. No. W-78-CA-68 (WD Tex Oct. 31, 1979), aff'd on other 
grounds, 675 F.2d 734 (CA5 1982). Application for Stay, at 7. 
6People v. Murtishaw, __ Cal. 3d __ , 631 P.2d 446, 175 Cal. 
Rptr. 738 (1981). Murtishaw relies on evidentiary principles of 
state law in determining that testimony like that presented in 
this case is inadmissible as more prejudicial than probative. 
See 631 P.2d, at 466-471. But similar concerns about the 
reliability of psychiatric testimonv as to dangerousness may be 
relevant to a constitutional due process inquiry. See Addington 
v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979). 
7The cases on which the Court of Appeals relies fall far 
short of expressly approving the conclusory responses to 
hypothetical questions at issue in this case. See Estelle v. 
Smith, supra; Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). At most, they 
can be read as holding that psychiatric testimony on the issue of 
dangerousness is not unacceptable in all cases. 
- -6- -
• above has disturbing implications for three reasons. First, even 
if in some cases the requirements of due process may be met by 
final disposition of the merits of an appeal on a motion for a 
stay, the procedures used in the Court of Appeals substantially 
compromise the quality of aopellate adjudication compared with 
the normal process of appellate dec i sionmaking. Second, the 
standards applied below represent a significant departure from 
the approach taken by other federal Courts of Appeals and from 
prior practice in the Fifth Circuit. And finally, resolution of 
petitioner's claims in this posture requires this Court to 
address substantial questions of law without the opportunity 
• 
provided by our normal decisional procedures . 
' 
A 
The Court of Appeals cannot be taxed with failing to 
consider the merits of petitioner's claim. Given the speed with 
which the case proceeded, the court's opinion shows a commenaaDle 
effort to add r ess petitioner's claims regarding the psychiatric 
testimony at his trial. 
Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that petitioner was 
placed at a significant disadvantage by being required to argue 
the merits of his appeal in the expedited proceeding below. The 
normal processes for hearing appeals in the federal system 
provide that the appellant will have 10 days after filing a 
notice of appeal to order relevant portions of the district court 
record from the reporter and to file a notice of the issues to be 
raised on appeal. See Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure l0(b). 
After the record is filed, the appellant has 40 days to file a 
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brief, and in most cases another 14 days to file a reply brief 
after the appellee has responded. Federal Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 3l(a). In this case, however, crucial portions of the 
District Court record were not available until the very day of 
oral argument, and petitioner . never had an opportunity to address 
them in writing. He had no opportunity to file a full brief on 
the merits. The Court of Appeals was informed by letter that the 
American Psychiatric Association wished to participate in the 
case as amicus curiae, but the swift disposition of the stay 
motion p r ecluded such participation. 
As the court below noted, this Court has held that, once a 
district court has granted a federal habeas petition~r a 
certificate of probable cause to appeal, the court of appeals 
must address the merits of the appeal. Garrison v. Patterson, 
391 U.S. A64, 466 (1968); Nowakowski v. Maroney, 386 U.S. 542 
(19~7); see also Brooks v. Estelle, supra, at 
~ 
(JUSTICES 
BRENNAN, MARSHALL & STEVENS, dissenting). Both Garrison and 
Carafas v. Lavallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968), make clear that the 
courts of appeals may, when appropriate, use summary procedures 
to address the merits of the appeal. "Nowakowsi does not 
necessarily require that the Court of Appeals give the parties 
full opportunity to submit briefs and argument in an appeal 
which, despite the issuance of a certificate of probable cause, 
is frivolous " 391 U.S., at 242; see 391 U.S., at 466. 
Against that background, this Court's summary disposition of the 
application for a stay in Brooks v. Estelle, supra, implies at 
least that a majority of the Court rejects the argument, which 
- -8- -
JUSTICE MARSHALL, JUSTICE STEVENS, and I raised in dissent, 8 that 
considering the merits of an appeal on a stay motion does not 
comport with the standard of Nowakowski. 
The Court's disposition of Brooks, however, does not reject 
the basic doctrine that courts of appeals must address the merits 
of an appeal before denying a stay that effectively precludes 
full consideration of the appeal. Nor does Brooks' taciturn 
language establish that i t is always appropriate to resolve the 
merits of habeas app eals in capital cases on motions for stays of 
execution. The crucial question is what standard should the 
courts of appeals apply in deciding when to grant a stay to allow 
plenary consideration of a pending appeal and when to dispose of 
the merits in denying the stay. 
Given that normal appellate procedures can only improve 
the quality of a decision on the merits, their advantages should 
__ ce-..r.tainly be taken into account in answering the question posed 
above. It is certainly conceivable that an appellant could 
receive due process in an appeal without 40 days for briefing 
after the record is received, but Congress and the Rules drafters 
have determined that 40 days--or something close to it 9--strikes 
8JUSTICE BLACKMUN, while sitting on the Eighth Circuit Court 
of Appeals, also wrote that "when the district court issue[s] the 
certificate [of probable causel the appellate court must indulge 
in a full review." Blackmun, Allowance of In Forma Pauperis 
Appeals in §2255 and Habeas Corpus Cases, 43 F.R.D. 343, 351 
(1968). 
9courts of appeals are free to shorten the time periods by 
rule, but it is difficult to conceive of the possibility that 
most appeals would be handled on a 14-day briefing schedule. 
.---
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an appropriate balance between the need for expedition and the 
requirements of reasoned presentation of issues to appellate 
courts. Courts should not depart from that benchmark in finally 
resolving an appeal unless the departure is demanded by 
emergency, obvious frivolity, . or a balance of hardships strongly 
weighted against the appellant. None of those conditions was 
met in this case, nor did the Court of Appeals find that they 
were. 10 
B 
Precisely what standards govern applications for stays of 
execution in other circuits is difficult to document: denials of 
stays in the face of an impending execution date have been, so 
far at least, exceedingly rare. Nevertheless, it appears that 
the Eleventh Circuit applies an explicit "non-frivolous issues" 
test, see Goode v. Wainwright, 670 F.2d 941, 942 (1982) ~ cf. 
Dobbert v. Strickland, 670 F.2d 938 (1982). 11 The single judge'B 
opinion in Shaw v. Martin, 613 F.2d 487 (CA4 1980) (on application 
for stay presented to Phillips, J.), indicates that, in the 
Fourth Circuit, if an applicant is presenting an appeal from a 
first federal habeas decision, a stay will be granted and the 
appeal will be heard on the merits without any initial showing of 
10 rn Brooks v. Estelle, supra, at least an argument could be 
made that clear precedent dictated rejecting petitioner's 
substantive grounds for appeal. 
11carafas v. Lavallee, supra, at 242, on which the Court of 
Appeals relies, also supports a "non-frivolous" test. See ante 
- 7 --at . 
• 
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either likelihood of success or non-frivolousness. 
"I have been mindful that even with respect to 
issues pending for first instance resolution, it may be 
appropriate to require a facial showing of substance to 
justify a stay. But it seems to me that the inquiry 
into substance properly stops with identification of 
the nature of the issue, and with consideration as to 
whether it has been already fairly litigated on the 
merits under procedures designed for the purpose. In 
the very nature of proceedings on a motion for a stay 
of execution, the limited record coupled with the time 
constaints imposed by imminence of execution preclude 
any fine-tuned inquiry into the actual merits." 613 
F.2d, at 491-492 (citation omitted; emphasis added). 
Older precedents in the Third and Ninth Circuits indicate that, 
at least at one point, both Circuits granted stays automatically 
if a certificate :of probable cause had been issued. United 
' States ex rel. DeVita v. Mccorkle, 214 F.2d 823 (CA3 1954); 
Foquette v. Bernard, 198 F.2d 96 (CA9 1952). 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals in this case 
demonstrates that it is following a substantially different 
standard from other fe-deral courts of appeals. Furthermore, 
there is no indication in the court's opinion that it has 
considered the balance of hardships presented by an application 
for a stay of execution pending appeal from a first habeas 
petition. Even accepting arguendo the legitimacy of the State's 
asserted interest in carrying out its sentences, the equities can 
only favor granting a stay, especially if the appeal is not 
frivolous. The very precedents from its own Circuit upon which 
the Court of Appeals relies state that "the movant need not 
always show a 'probability' of success on the merits; instead, 
the movant need only present a substantial case on the merits 
when a serious legal question is involved and show that the 
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balance of equities weighs heavily in favor of granting a stay." 
Ruiz v. Estelle, 666 F.2d 854, 856 (CA5 1982) (original emphasis); 
Ruiz v. Estelle, 650 F.2d 555, 565 (CA5 1981). It is thus 
apparent that, in addition to employing a standard different from 
that used in other Circuits, the Court of Appeals is subjecting 
applications for stays of execution to a higher standard than it 
uses for other stays pending appeal, even when, as in Ruiz, 
substantial questions of State-Federal comity are at stake. I 
question whether that decision comports with constitutional and 
prudential norms of equity. 
C 
Finally, it is important to note ~he deleterious effects of 
the Court of Appeals' denial of a stay pending a non-frivolous 
appeal on this Court's role in the appellate structure. An 
application for a stay of execution, by the time it reaches this 
Co~rt, may require a decision in a matter of days, if not hours. 
The parties themselves file extremely short memoranda, and we 
have no opportunity to receive briefs from interested amici. In 
the case before us, furthermore, our own precedents provide onlv 
oblique guidance, if any guidance at all, on the merits of 
petitioner's appeal, and apart from the opinion below there is 
no developed body of decisional law in the courts of appeals. In 
addition, since the Slaughterhouse Cases, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 273, 
296-297 (1869), plenary consideration of the standards for 
granting stays pending appeal has been rare in this Court. 
We have thus been forced to decision on both substantive 
and procedural questions in extreme haste, and without the 
-
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substantial aids of high-quality adversary presentation of the 
issues and well-developed precedents. Cf. O'Brien v. Brown, 409 
U.S. 1, 5-6 (1972) (JUSTICE BRENNAN, concurring). And we cannot 
avoid at least the semblance of a decision on the merits, because 
it is difficult, if not impossible, that this Court would send a 
man to his death without actually deciding whether the Court of 
Appeals used an acceptable standard for evaluating the merits of 
the appeal or whether its evaluation of the merits was correct. 
Since it appears that this problem is likely to recur, and since 
petitioner presents a case where the grounds for appeal are 
clearly not frivolous, I would grant certiorari to decide--with 
full briefing, oral argument, and (if they wish) the assistan~e 
of amici such as the Attorneys General of other States or the 
American Bar Association--the proper standards for granting a 
stay of execution pending appeal. Granting certiorari in this 
_ case would give .the Court an opportunity to 
-=-
shape the processes by which these issues come to it on something 
more than an ad hoc basis. 
III 
In conclusion, petitioner has proposed to file a petition 
for certiorari raising a question fairly presented by this case. 
For the reasons set forth above, I believe it would be wise to 
consider the question of standards for granting stays of 
execution pending appeal at this time. Accordingly, I would 
grant a stay pending filing and disposition of the proposed 
petition for certiorari, or, in the alternative, I would treat 
the application before us as a petition for certiorari and grant it. 
- -OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
WASHINGTON. D . C .. 20543 
January 24, 1983 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
RE: 82-6080 
(A-638) 
THOMAS A. BAREFOOT v. W. J. ESTELLE, 
DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
At the request of Justice Brennan, I have expedited 
the briefing schedule so that the above case can be set for 
argument on Tuesday, April 26, 1983. 
. Petitioner's brief and the joint appendix are to 
be filed by March 5, 1983. The resp ondent's brief is to be 
filed by April 2, 1983. The reply br i ef, if any, is to be 
filed by April 18, 1983. 
Respectfully submitted, 
a ( ~ L~ 





MONDAY, JANUARY 24, 1983 
CERTIORARI GRANTED 
THOMAS A. BAREFOOT v. W.J. ESTELLE, DIRECTOR, 
TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
The application for stay of execution of sentence. of 
death was presented to Justice White and referred to the 
Court. Treating the application as a petition for writ 
of certiorari before judgment, certiorari is granted. 
The parties are directed to brief and argue the question 
presented by the application,· namely, the appropriate 
standard for granting or denying a stay of execution pend-
ing disposition of an appeal by a federal court of appeals 
·by ' a death-sentenced federal habeas corpus petitioner, and 
also the issues on the appeal before the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Execution and 
enforcement of the sentence of death set for Tuesday, 
January 25, 1983 1s stayed pending the sending down of the 




MONDAY, JANUARY 24, 1983 
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THOMAS A. BAREFOOT v. W.J. ESTELLE, DIRECTOR, 
TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
The application for stay of execution of sentence of 
ijeath was presented to Justice White and referred to the 
Court. Treating the application as a petition for writ 
of certiorari before judgment, certiorari is granted. 
The parties are directed to brief and argue the question 
presented by the application, namely, the appropriate 
standard for granting or denying a stay of execution pend-
ing disposition of an appeal by a federal court of appeals 
by a death-sentenced federal habeas corpus petitioner, and 
also the issues on the appeal before the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Execution and 
enforcement of the sentence of death set for Tuesday, 
January 25, 1983 is stayed pending the sending down of the 




MONDAY, JANUARY 24, 1983 
CERTIORARI GRANTED 
THOMAS A. BAREFOOT v. W.J. ESTELLE, DIRECTOR, 
TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
The applic~tion for stay of execution of sentence of 
death was presented to Justice White and referred to the 
Court. Treating the application as a petition for writ 
of certiorari before judgment, certiorari is granted. 
The parties are directed to brief and argue the question 
presented by the application, namely, the appropriate 
standard for granting or denying a stay of execution pend~ 
ing disposition of an appeal by a federal court of appeals 
by a death-sentenced federal habeas corpus petitioner, and 
also the issues on the appeal before the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Execution and 
enforcement of the sentence of death set for Tuesday, 
January 25, 1983 is stayed pending the sending down of the 
judgment of this Court. 
-
Barefoot v. Estelle 
No. A-638 
On Application for Stay 
January 24, 1983 
Memorandum of JUSTICE BRENNAN. 
-
We have before us an application for a stay of an execution 
scheduled to take place on Tuesday, January 25, 1983. Petitioner 
applies for a stay of execution pending filing in and disposition 
by this Court of a petition for certiorari to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, presenting the question 
of "the appropriate standard for granting or denying a stay of 
execution when a death-sentenced federal habeas corpus petitioner 
presents a constitutional issue of first impression to a federal 
court of appeals." Application for Stay, at 2. 
I adhere to my view that the death penalty is in all 
circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 
227 (1976}, and I would grant the application and vacate 
petitioner's sentence of death for that reason alone. 
Independently of that view, however, I believe that a petition 
for certiorari presenting the question proposed by petitioner 
should be granted. The question of the proper standard for 
granting stays in death penalty cases involves fundamental issues 
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of orderly judicial process which this Court has never addressed 
and about which the lower federal courts have differed. It 
merits the kind of consideration that full briefing and oral 
argument would provide. Therefore, I would also grant the stay 
pending receipt and disposition of a petition for certiorari, or, 
in the alternative, I would treat the application before us as a 
petition for certiorari on this issue, see Brooks v. Estelle, 
U.S. (1982) (per curiam), and grant it. 1 
I 
For the second time in as many months, this Court is faced 
with an application for a stay of execution in a case pending on 
appeal before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit. See Brooks v. Estelle, U.S. (1982). Both this 
case and Brooks involve a decision by the Court of Appeals to 
deny an application for a stay aodressed to it, despite the fact 
that in both cases the District Court had issued a certificate of 
probable cause to appeal, see 28 U.S.C. §2253, and an appeal had 
in fact been docketed. 
In its opinion denying a stav in this case, the Court of 
Appeals states the following legal standards: 
"This court may interfere with the action of the 
State of Texas only upon a showing that the 
Constitution of the United States has been violated. 
Upon the question of whether to stay execution until 
the appeal has been processed, we consider the 
likelihood of success of that appeal. Ruiz v. Estelle, 
666 F.2d 555 (CA5 1981). There should be a substantial 
1since the Court of Appeals' decision denying a stay is 
obviously a final resolution of the case, this Court has 
jurisdiction to review it on writ of certiorari. 
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case on the merits of any serious legal question 
involved in the appeal to warrant staying the decision 
below. Ruiz v. Estelle, 666 F.2d 854, 857 (CA5 1982)." 
Barefoot-v-:-Estelle, No. 82-1680 (CA5 Jan. 20, 1983), 
at 3. 
At the close of its opinion, the court concludes: 
"This Court has had . the benefit of the full trial 
court record except for a few exhibits unimportant to 
our considerations. We have read the arguments and 
materials filed by the parties. The petitioner is 
represented here, as he has been throughout the habeas 
corpus proceedings in state and federal courts, by a 
competent attorney experienced in this area of the law. 
We have heard full arguments in open court. Finding no 
patent substantial merit, or semblance thereof, to 
petitioner's constitutional object i ons, we must 
conclude and order that the motion for stay should be 
DENIED." Id., at 16. 
The Court of Appeals denied petitioner's stay application 
less than a week after the application was filed, and less than 
three days after scheduling the · appl i c'ati on for oral argum~nt. 
Necessarily, briefing on the merits of the appeal underlying the 
stay__-application was limited. Petitioner--who has never delayed 
in presenting his claims to federal and state forums--had less 
than two weeks in all to prepare and present his application to 
the Court of Appeals. 2 
2Petitioner Thomas Barefoot was convicted of murdering a 
policeman. After the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed 
his conviction, Barefoot v. State, 596 S.W.2d 875 (1980), and 
this Court denied certiorari, 453 U.S. 913 (1981), petitioner was 
sentenced to be executed on October 16, 1981. After exhausting 
his state collateral remedies, petitioner applied for federal 
habeas corpus, and his execution was stayed on October 9, 1981. 
The United States District Court held an evidentiary hearing on 
petitioner's habeas claim and finally denied it thirteen months 
later in November 1982. The District Court issued petitioner a 
certificate of probable cause to appeal the denial of his habeas 
petition, see 28 u.s.c. §2253, and petitioner promptly noticed 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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II 
A brief examination of the question presented by 
petitioner's appeal below demonstrates that his appeal is far 
from frivolous, and therefore that the phrases used by the Court 
of Appeals--"a substantial case on the merits" and "patent 
substantial merit"--refer to some quality beyond mere non-
frivolity. Petitioner claimed that conclusory testimony at the 
penalty phase of his trial by a psychiatrist 3 who had never 
examined him, but who merely responded to a long, argumentative 
hypothetical question put to him by the State, violated 
petitione~'s rights to due process and freedom from cruel and 
unusual p~nishment under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 4 The District Court rejected petitioner's claim 
his appeal. 
On the State's motion, the District Court lifted its stay on 
December 8, 1982, whereupon on December 20 a state court 
sentenced petitioner to be executed on January 25, 1983. 
Petitioner immediately sought state habeas corpus relief on the 
ground that the state court had no jurisdiction to set an 
execution date. On January 7, 1983, he was informed that the 
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals had denied him relief, and a 
second motion for relief was denied on January 11. He then 
applied to the United States Court of Appeals for a stay of 
execution pending resolution of his pending appeal in that court. 
On the afternoon of Monday, January 17, the Court of Appeals 
scheduled oral argument on the stav for the morning of January 
19. The Court of Appeals heard oral argument and issued a 16-
page typewritten opinion denying the stay early on the afternoon 
of January 20. The application to this Court followed. 
3The psychiatrist whose testimony is at issue in this case, 
Dr. Grigson, is the same psychiatrist involved in Estelle v. 
Smith, 451 U.S. 455 (1981). 
4JUSTICE MARSHALL'S dissent describes the merits of 
petitioner's claims in more detail. 
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after an evidentiary hearing, and the Court of Appeals addressed 
it on its merits in its opinion denying a stay. Yet neither the 
District Court nor the Court of Appeals identified prior 
controlling precedents from this Court, the Fifth Circuit, or any 
other Circuit on the issue. Instead, it appears that other 
District Courts within the Fifth Circuit itself 5 , as well as at 
least one state supreme court 6 have reached contrary 
determinations. Read closely, the Court of Appeals' 
determination on the merits in this case rests entirely on its 
statement that "the Supreme Court has, by implication at least, 
approved of psychiatric testimony in cases such as these." Id., 
at 9. 7 
The fact that the Court of Appeals has declined to issue a 
stay with knowledge that petitioner will be executed before it 
can give full consideration to his appeal on the issue described 
5Petitioner's application cites White v. Estelle, Civ. A. No. 
H-81-1661 (SD Tex Dec. 30, 1982), and Gholson v. Estelle, Civ. 
A. No. W-78-CA-68 (WD Tex Oct. 31, 1979), aff'd on other 
grounds, 675 F.2d 734 (CA5 1982). Application for Stay, at 7. 
6People v. Murtishaw, Cal. 3d , 631 P.2d 446, 175 Cal. 
Rptr. 738 (1981). Murtishaw relies on evidentiary principles of 
state law in determining that testimony like that presented in 
this case is inadmissible as more prejudicial than probative. 
See 631 P.2d, at 466-471. But similar concerns about the 
reliability of psychiatric testimony as to dangerousness may be 
relevant to a constitutional due process inquiry. See Addington 
v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979). 
7The cases on which the Court of Appeals relies fall far 
short of expressly approving the conclusory responses to 
hypothetical questions at issue in this case. See Estelle v. 
Smith, supra: Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). At most, they 
can be read as holding that psychiatric testimony on the issue of 
dangerousness is not unacceptable in all cases. 
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above has disturbing implications for three reasons. First, even 
if in some cases the requirements of due process may be met by 
final disposition of the merits of an appeal on a motion for a 
stay, the procedures used in the Court of Appeals substantially 
compromise the quality of aopellate adjudication compared with 
the normal process of appellate aecisionmaking. Second, the 
standards applied below represent a significant departure from 
the approach taken by other federal Courts of Appeals and from 
prior practice in the Fifth Circuit. And finally, resolution of 
petitioner's claims in this posture requires this Court to 
address substantial questions of law without the opportunity 
provided by our normal decisional procedures. 
A 
The Court of Appeals cannot be taxed with failing to 
consider the merits of petitioner's claim. Given the speed with 
which the case proceeded, the court's opinion shows a commenaanie 
effort to address petitioner's claims regarding the psychiatric 
testimony at his trial. 
Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that petitioner was 
placed at a significant disadvantage by being required to argue 
the merits of his appeal in the expedited proceeding below. The 
normal processes for hearing appeals in the federal system 
provide that the appellant will have 10 days after filing a 
notice of appeal to order relevant portions of the district court 
record from the reporter and to file a notice of the issues to be 
raised on appeal. See Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure l0(b). 
After the record is filed, the appellant has 40 days to file a 
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• brief, and in most cases another 14 days to file a reply brief 
after the appellee has responded. Federal Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 3l(a). In this case, however, crucial portions of the 
District Court record were not available until the very day of 
oral argument, and petitioner . never had an opportunity to address 
them in writing. He had no opportunity to file a full brief on 
the merits. The Court of Appeals was informed by letter that the 
American Psychiatric Association wished to participate in the 
case as amicus curiae, but the swift disposition of the stay 
motion precluded such participation. 
As the court below noted, this Court has held that, once a 
district court has granted a federal habeas petitioner a 
certificate of probable cause to appeal, the court of appeals 
must address the merits of the appeal. Garrison v. Patterson, 
391 U.S. 464, 466 (1968); Nowakowski v. Maroney, 386 U.S. 542 
_(1967->-; - see also Brooks v. Estelle, supra, ·at (JUSTICES 
BRENNAN, MARSHALL & STEVENS, dissenting). Both Garrison and 
Carafas v. Laval l ee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968), make clear that the 
courts of appeals may, when appropriate, use summary procedures 
to address the merits of the appeal. "Nowakowsi does not 
necessarily requ i re that the Court of Appeals give the parties 
full opportunity to submit briefs and argument in an appeal 
which, despite the issuance of a certificate of probable cause, 
is frivolous " 391 U.S., at 242; see 391 U.S., at 466. 
Against that background, this Court's summary disposition of the 
application for a stay in Brooks v. Estelle, supra, implies at 
least that a majority of the Court rejects the argument, which 
··~ '!i:':i-· 
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JUSTICE MARSHALL, JUSTICE STEVENS, and I raised in dissent, 8 that 
considering the merits of an appeal on a stay motion does not 
comport with the standard of Nowakowski. 
The Court's disposition of Brooks, however, does not reject 
the basic doctrine that courts of appeals must address the merits 
of an appeal before denying a stay that effectively precludes 
full consideration of the appeal. Nor does Brooks' taciturn 
language establish that it is always appropriate to resolve the 
merits of habeas appeals in capital cases on motions for stays of 
execution. The crucial question is what standard should the 
courts of appeals apply in deciding when to grant a stay to allow 
plenary consideration of a pending appeal and when to dispose of 
the merits in denying the stay. 
Given that normal appellate procedures can only improve 
the quality of a decision on the merits, their advantages should 
ce_rtaiply be taken into account in answering the question posed 
above. It is certainly conceivable that an appellant could 
receive due process in an appeal without 40 days for briefing 
after the record is received, but Congress and the Rules drafters 
have determined that 40 days--or something close to it 9--strikes 
8JUSTICE BLACKMUN, while sitting on the Eighth Circuit Court 
of Appeals, also wrote that "when the district court issue[s] the 
certificate [of probable causel the appellate court must indulge 
in a full review." Blackmun, Allowance of In Forma Pauperis 
Appeals in §2255 and Habeas Corpus Cases, 43 F.R.D. 343, 351 
(1968). 
9courts of appeals are free to shorten the time periods by 
rule, but it is difficult to conceive of the possibility that 
most appeals would be handled on a 14-day briefing schedule. 
... ... . 1 • 
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an appropriate balance between the need for expedition and the 
requirements of reasoned presentation of issues to appellate 
courts. Courts should not depart from that benchmark in finally 
resolving an appeal unless the departure is demanded by 
emergency, obvious frivolity, . or a balance of hardships strongly 
weighted against the appellant. None of those conditions was 
met in this case, nor did the Court of Appeals find that they 
were. 10 
B 
Precisely what standards govern applications for stays of 
execution in other circuits is difficult to document: denials of 
stays in the face qf an impending execution date have been, so 
far at least, exceedingly rare. Nevertheless, it appears that 
the Eleventh Circuit applies an explicit "non-frivolous issues" 
test, see Goode v. Wainwright, 670 F.2d 941, 942 (1982); cf. 
Dabber± v. Strickland, 670 .F.2d 938 (1982L 11 The single judge's 
opinion in Shaw v. Martin, 613 F.2d 487 (CA4 1980) (on application 
for stay presented to Phillips, J.), indicates that, in the 
Fourth Circuit, if ari applicant is presenting an appeal from a 
first federal habeas decision, a stay will be granted and the 
appeal will be heard on the merits without any initial showing of 
10 rn Brooks v. Estelle, supra, at least an argument could be 
made that clear precedent dictated rejecting petitioner's 
substantive grounds for appeal. 
11carafas v. Lavallee, supra, at 242, on which the Court of 




either likelihood of success or non-frivolousness. 
"I have been mindful that even with respect to 
issues pending for first instance resolution, it may be 
appropriate to require a facial showing of substance to 
justify a stay. But it seems to me that the inquiry 
into substance properly stops with identification of 
the nature of the issue, and with consideration as to 
whether it has been already fairly litigated on the 
merits under procedures designed for the purpose. In 
the very nature of proceedings on a motion for a stay 
of execution, the limited record coupled with the time 
constaints imposed by imminence of execution preclude 
any fine-tuned inquiry into the actual merits." 613 
F.2d, at 491-492 (citation omitted; emphasis added). 
Older precedents in the Third and Ninth Circuits indicate that, 
at least at one point, both Circuits granted stays automatically 
if a certificate of probable cause had be~n issued. United 
States ex rel. DeVita v. Mccorkle, 214 F.2d 823 (CA3 1954); 
Poquette v. Bernard, 198 F.2d 96 (CA9 1952). 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals in this case 
demonstrates that it is following a substantially different 
standard from other federal courts of appeals. Furthermore, 
there is no indication in the court's opinion that it has 
considered the balance of hardships presented by an application 
for a stay of execution pending appeal from a first habeas 
petition. Even accepting arguendo the legitimacy of the State's 
asserted interest in carrying out its sentences, the equities can 
only favor granting a stay, especially if the appeal is not 
frivolous. The very precedents from its own Circuit upon which 
the Court of Appeals relies state that "the movant need not 
always show a 'probability' of success on the merits; instead, 
the movant need only present a substantial case on the merits 
when a serious legal question is involved and show that the 
- -11- -
balance of equities weighs heavily in favor of granting a stay." 
Ruiz v. Estelle, 666 F.2d 854, 856 (CA5 1982) (original emphasis); 
Ruiz v. Estelle, 650 F.2d 555, 565 (CA5 1981). It is thus 
apparent that, in addition to employing a standard different from 
that used in other Circuits, the Court of Appeals is subjecting 
applications for stays of execution to a higher standard than it 
uses for other stays pending appeal, even when, as in Ruiz, 
substantial questions of State-Federal comity are at stake. I 
question whether that decision comports with constitutional and 
prudential norms of equity. 
C 
Finally, it is important to note the deleterious effects ?f 
the Court of Appeals' denial of a stay pending a non-frivolous 
appeal on this Court's role in the appellate structure. An 
application for a stay of execution, by the time it reaches this 
_courtJ may require a decision in a matter of days, if not hours. 
The parties themselves file extremely short memoranda, and we 
have no opportunity to receive briefs from interested amici. In 
the case before us, furthermore, our own precedents provide onlv 
oblique guidance, if any guidance at all, on the merits of 
petitioner's appeal, and apart from the opinion below there is 
no developed body of decisional law in the courts of appeals. In 
addition, since the Slaughterhouse Cases, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 273, 
296-297 (1869), plenary consideration of the standards for 
granting stays pending appeal has been rare in this Court. 
We have thus been forced to decision on both substantive 
and procedural questions in extreme haste, and without the 
., 
- -12- -
substantial aids of high-qualitv adversary presentation of the 
issues and well-developed precedents. Cf. O'Brien v. Brown, 409 
U.S. 1, 5-6 (1972) (JUSTICE BRENNAN, concurring). And we cannot 
avoid at least the semblance of a decision on the merits, because 
it is difficult, if not impossible, that this Court would send a 
man to his death without actua l ly deciding whether the Court of 
Appeals used an acceptable standard for evaluating the merits of 
the appeal or whether its evaluation of the merits was correct. 
Since it appears that this problem is likely to recur, and since 
petitioner presents a case where the grounds for a ppeal are 
clearly not frivolous, I would grant certiorari to decide--with 
full briefing, oral argument, and (if they wish) the assistance 
of amici such as the Attorneys General of other States or the 
American Bar Association--the proper standards for granting a 
stay of execution pending appeal. Granting certiorari in this 
- case _}V_ould give the Court an opportunityc; to : --~ -,.· , . _·_ •, -~ -~.!.. __ .J~. 
shape the processes by which these issues come to it on something 
more than an ad hoc basis. 
III 
In conclusion, petitioner has proposed to file a petition 
for certiorari raising a question fairly presented by this case. 
For the reasons set forth above, I believe it would be wise to 
consider the question of standards for granting stays of 
execution pending appeal at this time. Accordingly, I would 
grant a stay pending filing and disposition of the proposed 
petition for certiorari, or, in the alternative, I would treat 
! ' 
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JUSTICE MARSHALL, dissenting. 
The Court today continues the judicial abrogation of the 
right to federal appellate review in capital cases that it began 
in Brooks v. Estelle, -- U. S. -- (1982). Petitioner per-
suaded the District Court that there is substantial merit to 
his claim that the Constitution does not permit the imposition 
of the death penalty on the basis of predictions by psychia-
trists v. he haw rmror mrnmia1ui ai• that he will engage in 
dangerous conduct if allowed to live. Accordingly, the Dis-
trict Court issued a certificate of probable cause to appeal 
from its order denying petitioner's application for a writ of 
habeas corpus. Congress has expressly provided that a 
state prisoner has a right to appeal the denial of a petition for 
a writ of habeas corpus if he obtains a certificate of probable 
cause to appeal. Yet both the Fifth Circuit and this Court 
have refused to stay petitioner's execution pending his ap-
peal, thereby allowing the State of Texas to put petitioner to 
death before his appeal can be decided. 
I dissent. Once a federal judge has decided, as the district 
judge did here, that a prisoner under a sentence of death has 
raised constitutional claims of merit, it is a travesty of justice 
to permit the State to execute the prisoner while his appeal is 
still pending. Where a man's life is at stake, a constitutional 
claim that a federal judge has deemed substantial should not 
be rejected without plenary review following a full opportu-








The right of a state prisoner to petition a federal court for a 
writ of habeas corpus has been part of our federal system for 
more than a century. 1 An integral part of the system of col-
lateral review that Congress created is the right to appeal 
from a district court order denying a writ of habeas corpus. 
Title 28, Section 2253 of the United States Code expressly 
provides that an order denying a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus "shall be subject to review, on appeal, by the court of 
appeals for the circuit where the proceeding is had." (Em-
phasis supplied.) 
Congress has imposed one condition on the right to appeal 
and one condition only: the prisoner must obtain a certificate 
of probable to appeal from "the justice or judge who rendered 
the order or a circuit justice or judge." Ibid. The issuance 
of a certificate of probable cause represents a determination 
that the prisoner's appeal raises a substantial claim. Under 
the standard prevailing in the Fifth Circuit, a judge will issue 
a certificate of probable cause only if the prisoner makes a 
"substantial showing of the denial of [a] federal right." 
Stewart v. Beto, 454 F. 2d 268, 270 n. 2 (CA5 1971), cert. de-
nied, 406 U. S. 925 (1972), quoting Harris v. Ellis, 204 F. 2d 
685, 686 (CA5 1953). In this case, although the district 
judge denied petitioner's application for a writ of habeas cor-
pus, he concluded that petitioner's claims had sufficient sub-
stance to warrant consideration by three judges of the Court 
of-.~ppeals and accordingly issued a certificate of probable 
~ e to appeal. 
Since the issuance of a certificate of probable cause consti-
tutes a ruling that the prisoner's appeal has raised a substan-
tial claim, "the court of appeals must proceed to a disposition 
of the appeal in accord with its ordinary procedure" when a 







certificate o/ probable cause has been issued. Nowakowski 
v. Maroney, 386 U. S. 542, 543 (1967) (per curiam). "[I]f an 
appellant persuades an appropriate tribunal that probable 
cause for an appeal exists, he must then be afforded an oppor-
tunity to address the underlying merits." Garrison v. Pat-
terson, 391 U. S. 464, 466 (1968) (per curiam). See Black-
mun, Allowance of In Forma Pauperis Appeals in§ 2255 and 
Habeas Corpus Cases, 43 F.R.D. 343, 351 (1968) ("when the 
district court issue[s] the certificate the appellate court must 
indulge in a full review"). 
In a capital case, a court of appeals cannot discharge its ob-
ligation to decide a prisoner's appeal on the merits if it allows 
the State to execute the prisoner while his appeal is still 
pending. "[I]f there is probable cause to appeal it would be a 
mockery of federal justice to execute [the prisoner] pending 
its consideration." Foquette v. Bernard, 198 F. 2d 96, 97 
(CA9 1952) (Denman, J.). Accord, United States ex rel. 
DeVita v. McCorkle, 214 F. 2d 823 (CA3 1954). 
Once a certificate of probable cause has been issued, the 
most fundamental considerations of equity dictate that the 
status quo be preserved "to prevent irreparable injury to the 
[prisoner] resulting from the premature enforcement of a 
determination which may later be found to have been 
wrong." Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U. S. 4, 
9 (1942). Where preservation of the status quo is necessary 
to prevent irreparable harm to the appellant and will cause 
little or no harm to the appellee, an applicant for a stay@ 
his appeal raises a substantial legal question. 2 In a capital 
2 See, e.g., Ruiz v. Estelle, 650 F. 2d 555, 565 (CA5 1981); Providence 
Journal Co. v. FBI, 595 F . 2d 889,890 (CAI 1979); WashingtonMetro-poli-
f;an Transit Comm'n v. Holiday Tours, 559 F. 2d 841, 843-844 (CADC 
1977). As the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recognized in Ruiz v. 
Estelle, 
"on motions for stay pending appeal the movant need not always show a 
'probability' of success on the merits; instead, the movant need only 
present a substantial case on the merits when a serious legal question is 






case, it is indisputable that preservation of the status quo is 
essential to prevent irreparable harm-the execution of the 
prisoner. It is likewise indisputable that a stay of execution 
will cause no harm to the State apart from :..;;quiting it ~ 
"9eM" the minimal burden of providing a jail cell for the pris- - Ir:, l~ 
~ • \ aA ~J ~ '--- ~ner f?; the period of time necessary to decide his a C.O'V' CD \ 'Ill r 
Ml\'( I f\"TV' the State as m ms1s mg t at an execu-
tion be carried out at a particular timyit,1ut@ intu est pales be-
side the prisoner's interest in preserving his right to receive 
plenary appellate review of the constitutionality of his death 
sentence. A court should therefore grant a stay of execution 
even if it has "grave doubt ... as to whether [the prisoner] 
. . . presents any substantial constitutional question." Ed-
wards v. New York, 76 S. Ct. 538 (1956) (Harlan, J., in cham-
bers). Afortiori, a stay should be granted once a certificate 
of probable cause to appeal has been issued, for the issuance 
of the certificate represents a finding that the prisoner has 
raised a substantial constitutional claim. 3 
B 
Both the Court of Appeals and this Court apparently be-
lieve that the summary procedure for considering an applica-
tion for stay constitutes an adequate substitute for plenary 
review of the merits. I cannot agree. Under Rule 31(a) of 
involved and show that the balance of the equities weighs heavily in favor 
of granting the stay. If a movant were required in every case to establish 
that the appeal would probably be successful, the Rule would not require-
as it does-a prior presentation to the district judge whose order is being 
appealed. That judge has already decided the merits of the legal issue. 
The stay procedure of Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(c) and Fed. R. App. P. 8(a) af-
fords interim relief where relative harm and the uncertainty of final dispo-
sition justify it." 650 F. 2d, at 565 (citations omitted). 
3 It has long been the rule that when a defendant is sentenced to death 
by a federal court, his sentence will automatically be stayed if he takes an 
appeal. See Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 38(a)(l) ("A sentence of death shall be 






the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, a party is given 40 
days from the filing of the record to submit his brief on ap-
peal. This time period affords counsel an adequate opportu-
nity to review the record, research the law, and brief the 
merits. The court of appeals may then take as much time as 
is necessary for careful consideration of and reflection on~ ,tf, ~ 
guments made before it. 
By contrast, where a court of appeals has effectively dis-
posed of an appeal by denying an application for a stay, the 
court has not had the benefit of either a full adversarial pres-
entation or adequate time to evaluate the merits of the ap-
peal. "In the very nature of proceedings on a motion for 
stay of execution, the limited record coupled with the time 
constraints imposed by imminence of execution preclude any 
fine-tuned inquiry into the actual merits." Shaw v. Martin, 
613 F. 2d 487, 492 (CA4 1980) (Phillips, J.). 
Certainly in this case "the opportunity for adequate exer-
cise of the judicial judgment was wan~ Rosenberg v. 
United States, 346 U. S. 273, 31( ~1'ra er, J liJissent-
ing). The application for a stay was filed m the Co of Ap-
peals on Friday, January 14, 1983. On Monday afternoon, 
January 17, the court scheduled oral argument on the stay 
application for Wednesday, January 19. On Tuesday, Janu-
ary 18, the State filed its papers in opposition to the stay. 
On Wednesday morning, a three-judge panel heard oral argu-
ment on the stay. One of the members of the panel had been 
assigned to the case that very morning and had not yet seen 
any of the papers filed. 4 The next day the court denied the 
stay. It was only after the court had already issued its rul-
ing that the transcript of the habeas corpus proceeding in the 
District Court first became available to either the parties or 
the court. 
• The record of the state court trial and sentencing hearing was approxi-
mately 1,400 pages long. 
C 







This case illustrates the dangers that arise whenever a 
court of appeals precludes full consideration of the merits of a 
prisoner's appeal by denying a stay of execution despite the 
issuance of a certificate of probable cause. For the reasons 
elaborated below, I am convinced that the Court of Appeals 
erred in rejecting the conclusion of the District Court, which 
had given plenary consideration to petitioner's claims, that 
there is substance to petitioner's challenge to the constitu-
tionality of his death sentence. Petitioner's applications to 
the Court of Appeals and to this Court present the substan-
tial question whether a State may rely on a psychiatrist's pre-
diction of future dangerousness as a basis for imposing the 
death penalty. 
The Court of Appeals' conclusion that petitioner had failed 
to present a colorable claim rested on the incorrect assump-
tion that this Court's prior decisions have approved the use of 
psychiatric predictions of dangerousness. Slip op., at 9-10. 
Whether a defendant may constitutionally be sentenced to 
death on the basis of such predictions was not decided in ei-
ther Jurek v. Texas, 428 U. S. 262 (1976), or Estelle v. 
Smith, 451 U. S. 454 (1981). In Jurek the Court upheld the 
Texas death penalty statute but did not specifically address 
what types of evidence may be introduced. 5 Nor did the 
5 Indeed, in Jurek the Court quoted a passage from a state decision 
which indicated that the jury was to consider a defendant's background in 
making its own determination of future dangerousness. There was no 
suggestion that the jury would be presented with the testimony of psychia-
trists directly addressing the ultimate issue of future dangerousness: 
"'In determining the likelihood that the defendant would be a continuing 
threat to society, the jury could consider whether the defendant had a sig-
nificant criminal record. It could consider the range and severity of his 
prior criminal conduct. It could further look to the age of the defendant 
and whether or not at the time of the commission of the offense he was 
acting under duress or under the domination of another. It could also con-






Court decide the issue in Smith, which held only that psychi-
atric testimony based on an interview with the defendant 
should have been excluded because it had been obtained in 
violation of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. The few 
passing references in the Court's opinion in Smith to the fact 
that the Texas scheme contemplates the use of psychiatric 
testimony plainly did not constitute a determination that such 
testimony is consistent with constitutional requirements. 
See 451 U. S., at 472-473. 6 
There is a substantial question whether psychiatric predic-
tions of dangerousness are so inherently unreliable that the 
State may never rely on such testimony to impose the death 
sentence. See People v. Murtishaw, 175 Cal. Rptr. 738, 
--, 631 P. 2d 446, 469 (1981) (holding psychiatric predic-
tions of dangerousness inadmissible in capital cases). See 
also White v. Estelle, -- F.Supp. --, Civil Action No. 
H-81-1661 (SD Tex. Dec. 30, 1982) (expressing "serious res-
ervations" about permissibility of considering psychiatric 
predictions of future dangerousness). Within the psychi-
atric profession itself there appears to be substantial agree-
ment that long-term psychiatric predictions of future danger-
ousness are inherently unreliable. In 197 4 an American 
Psychiatric Association Task Force report concluded that 
tional pressure, something less, perhaps, than insanity, but more than the 
emotions of the average man, however inflamed, could withstand. ' 522 
S. W. 2d, at 939-940." 428 U. S. , at 272-273. 
6 The Court specifically noted that "the holding in Jurek was guided by 
recognition that the inquiry mandated by Texas law does not require resort 
to medical experts." 451 U. S. , at 473 (emphasis added). The clear impli-
cation is that the decision in Jurek upholding the Texas capital scheme did 
not decide what type of evidence may be considered by the jury. In Es-
telle the Court also acknowledged the view of the psychiatric community 
"that clinical predictions as to whether a person would or would not commit 
commit violent acts in the future are 'fundamentally of very low reliability' 
and that psychiatrists possess no special qualifications for making such 






predictions of future dangerousness "are fundamentally of 
very low reliability." 7 According to the Task Force, "the 
state of the art regarding predictions of violence is very un-
satisfactory. The ability of psychiatrists or any other pro-
fessionals to reliably predict future violence is unproved. . . . 
Psychiatric expertise in the prediction of 'dangerousness' is 
not established and clinicians should avoid conclusory judg-
ments in this regard." 8 
The passage of eight years since the Task Force Report 
was written has reinforced these conclusions. A draft report 
recently issued by another American Psychiatric Association 
Task Force concluded that "[c]onsiderable evidence has been 
accumulated by now to demonstrate that long-term predic-
tion by psychiatrists of future violence is an extremely inac-
curate process." 9 A recent study noted that "the prof es-
sional literature almost uniformly affirms low predictive 
accuracy with regard to the dangerousness of mental pa-
tients." 10 The Association has recently represented to this 
Court its position that psychiatric predictions of future dan-
gerousness are so i1M1n entsl~ unreliable that they should be 
prohibited in capital cases. Brief for American Psychiatric 
Association as Amicus Curiae 11-17, Estelle v. Smith, 
supra. 11 The Association has concluded that a prediction of 
7 American Psychiatric Association Task Force on Clinical Aspects of 
the Violent Individual, Clinical Aspects of the Violent Individual 23 
(1974). 
8 Id., at 30, 33. 
• American Psychiatric Association Task Force on the Role of Psychia-
try in the Sentencing Process 28. 
10 Schwitzgebel, "Prediction of Dangerousness and Its Implications for 
Treatment," in Curran, McGarry, & Petty, Modern Legal Medicine, Psy-
chiatry, and Forensic Medicine 784 (1980). 
11 Petitioner's counsel has represented to this Court that the American 
Psychiatric Association is prepared to file a amicus curiae brief in support 
of petitioner's petition for certiorari. The Association had also informed 






future dangerousness by a psychiatrist "involves no more 'ex-
pertise' -and certainly no more 'psychiatric expertise' -than 
does that of the average nonexpert." Id., at 14 (footnote 
omitted). Clearly no psychiatrist can be "one hundred per-
cent and absolute[ly ]" certain, as one of the psychiatrists tes-
tifying for the State claimed to be, that an individual will 
commit criminal acts of violence. Tr. 2131. 
Psychiatric predictions of future dangerousness raise par-
ticular problems in the context of the Texas death penalty 
scheme. Under the Texas scheme, the critical determina-
tion made by the sentencing jury is whether the defendant is 
likely to commit criminal acts in the future. 12 In Jurek v. 
Texas, supra, this Court upheld the Texas statute only on 
the assumption that the question of the defendant's future 
dangerousness encompasses a consideration of "whatever 
mitigating circumstances [the defendant] may be able to 
show." 428 U. S., at 272. 13 In this case, the precise ques-
court. 
12 Under the Texas statute the jury at the sentencing stage is instructed 
to answer the following questions: 
"(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the 
deceased was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation 
that the death of the deceased or another would result; 
"(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit 
criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to 
society; 
"(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in 
killing the deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if 
any, by the deceased." Art. 37.071 (b) (Supp. 1975-1976). 
If the jury answers "yes" to all applicable questions, the death sentence 
must be imposed. In almost all cases the answer to question (1) is a fore-
gone conclusion once the sentencing phase of the trial is reached. Ques-
tion (3) is frequently inapplicable. Consequently, in many cases the sen-
tence the defendant receives will depend entirely upon the jury's answer to 
question (2). 
13 The Court assumed that the jury would undertake an "objective con-






tion presented to the State's experts-whether the defendant 
was likely to commit future criminal acts of violence-was 
one of the ultimate questions to be decided by the sentencing 
jury. When a jury is permitted to consider psychiatric testi-
mony directly addressing this ultimate issue, the risk arises 
that it will give undue weight to the testimony of psychia-
trists and forego an independent determination of its own. 
There is in addition the possibility that the introduction of 
psychiatric predictions will limit the jury's focus to the nar-
row issue of future dangerousness and curtail the full consid-
eration of any relevant mitigating circumstances that is con- , • · \ ) 
stitutionally required. 
14 
( ~ "'~h~s is l V yp \ eo 
the individual offender." 428 U. S., at 271 It is constitutionally essen-
tial that the jury do so in deciding whether to impose the death sentence. 
See, e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, -- U.S.--, -- (1982); Lockett v. 
Ohio, 438 U. S. 586, 606 (1978) (plurality opinion); Roberts v. Louisiana, 
431 U. S. 633, 637 (1977) (per curiam); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 
U. S. 280, 303-304 (1976) (plurality opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STE-
VENS, JJ.). 
14 In non-capital cases, indeed even in civil cases, courts have often 
deemed it improper for experts to state their conclusions on "the ultimate 
issue to be decided by the jury upon all the evidence in obedience to the 
judge's instructions as to ... questions of law." United States v. 
Spaulding, 23 U. S. 498, 506 (1935). The danger created by such testi-
mony is that "the jury may forego independent analysis of the facts and 
bow too readily to the opinion of an expert or otherwise influential wit-
ness." McCormick, Evidence § 12, at 26 (1954). 
Here this risk was compounded by the manner in which the question of 
the defendant's future behavior was presented to the State's experts. The 
witnesses did not base their opinions upon an examination of the defend-
ant, but upon a lengthy description of a "hypothetical" individual. The de-
scription was, of course, drawn from the material facts as viewed by the 
prosecution. The use of such hypothetical questions may undermine the 
jury's independent determination of the facts because it places before the 
jury a partisan summation of the facts material to the sentencing deter-
mination. For this reason, the practice has been severely criticized, see 
McCormick, supra, at , 16, at 33-34, and has been termed by one judge 






A guiding principle in this Court's evolving capital punish-
ment jurisprudence is that the "qualitative difference" be-
tween the death penalty and other forms of punishment de-
mands "a corresponding difference in the need for reliability 
in the determination that death is the appropriate punish-
ment in a specific case." Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 
U. S. 280, 305 (1976). Without carefully considering the 
reliability of psychiatric predictions of future behavior, the 
Court of Appeals was in no position to reject the novel and 
complex claims raised by petitioner. 
III 
The State of Texas has scheduled petitioner's execution for 
Tuesday, January 25. In order to accomodate this schedule, 
the Court of Appeals moved with extraordinary speed to dis-
pose of petitioner's claims. In a civilized society, this precip-
itous end to a prisoner's life is no cause for celebration. "It 
is . . . important that before we allow human lives to be 
snuffed out we be sure-emphatically sure-that we act 
within the law." Rosenberg v. United States , 346 U. S., at 
321 (Douglas, J. , dissenting). The procedure followed by the 
Court of Appeals, and today condoned by this Court, did not 
provide the necessary certainty. The execution of petitioner 
while his appeal is pending will ensure that such certainty is 
never achieved. 
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BENCH MEMORANDUM 
No. 82-6080 
Barefoot v. Estelle 
Question Presented 
April 25, 1983 
1. What standards should a lower court apply in decid-
ing whether to grant a stay of execution in a capital case pend-
ing disposition of a federal habeas petition? 
2. May the prosecution use psychiatric testimony in 
response to a "hypothetical" question at the penalty phase of a 
capital case when (a) the question summarizes the evidence -against the defendant in explicit detail, (b) the witness has 
never examined the defendant, and (c) the answer is dispositive 
of one of the jury's ultimate findings? 
Outline of Memorandum 
I. Background 
A. Statutory Background 
B. Facts 
C. Prior Action in This Court 
D. Decisions Below 
II. Discussion 
A. Standards for a Stay 
1. General Observations. 
-
2. Standards on Initial Habeas. 
3. Standards on Subsequent Habeas. 
4. Advantages. 
5. Application of the Standards. 
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I. Background 
A. Statutory Background 
Under 28 u.s.c. §2254, a state prisoner may seek habeas 
relief in federal court "on the ground that he is in custody in 
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United 
States." Section 2253 provides that the final order in a habeas 
proceeding is "subject to review, on appeal, by the court of ap-
peals for the circuit where the proceeding is had." This right 
of appeal is subject to an important caveat: 
An appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals '1,,,,,,, ~ 
from the fina l order in a habeas corpus proceeding w( o 
where the detention complained of arises out of process u~_/ j ___ -J-. 
issued by a State court, unless the justice or judge 
who rendered the order or a_ circuit justice or judge ~ 
issues a certificate of proba~ cause. ~
~ 28 u.s.c. §2253. Rule 22 (b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure elaborates on this requirement. 
Section 2251 permits any "justice or judge • . • before 
whom a habeas corpus proceeding is pending" to stay all proceed-
ings against the petr until the case is resolved. Rule 8 of the 
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure details the procedures for 
obtaining a stay of a DC order, but it does not specify the sub-
stantive standards for such a stay. Some CAs have announced sub-
stantive standards, but this Court has never done so. ---To obtain the death penalty under Texas law, "[t] he 
state must prove • • • beyond a reasonable doubt," Tex. Code Crim. ~~ 
P. §37.07l(c), that "there is a probability that the defendant 
would commit er iminal acts of violence that would constitute a 
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B. Facts 
Petr was convicted of killing a police officer and sen-
tenced to death. The evidence of guilt seems overwhelming. When 
petr was arrested, for example, the gun that fired the fatal bul-
let was in his back pocket. 
At the sentencing phase of petr's trial, the State pre-
sented the "expert testimony" of two psychiatrists who regularly 
appear in support of ~eital s ~ntences--John Holbrook and James 
Grigson. either had ever examined petr,/ but both testified that 
~---------- I 
petr was likely to be dangerous in the future on the basis of a 
long "hypothetical" question. This "hypothetical" was a detailed 
recitation of ~ he --;?osecution's evidence in the case. For exam-
ple, the prosecutor asked each psychiatrist to "assume" that a 
"hypothetical" person used the alias Darren Callier (an alias 
that petr used), but that he later revealed to another "hypo-
thetical" person that his real name was Thomas Barefoot. The 
"hypothetical" also assumed certain states of mind. For example, 
the prosecutor asked each psychiatrist to assume "that Darren 
Callier never did anything whatsoever to show remorse for 
what happened to the police officer." 
Holbrook testified that the "hypothetical" Thomas Bare-
foot was a "criminal sociopath" and that he knew of no treatment 
that could change the behavior of such a person. Grigson testi-
fied that the "hypothetical" Thomas Barefoot "would be a fairly 
classical, typical, sociopathic personality disorder." He "most 
certainly would" commit criminal acts in the future. The proba-
~ 
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bility was "100% and absolute," "whether he was in the peniten-
tiary or whether he was free." 
Petr's conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal 
by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. 596 S.W.2d 875 (1980). 
An execution date was set. 
C. Prior Action in This Court 
You stayed the execution as Circuit Justice for the 
Fifth Circuit pending the filing and disposition of a cert petn. 
The petn was timely filed and initially held for the disposition 
of Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1980). 
After Smith was decided, the CHIEF JUSTICE (as author of 
the Smith majority) circulated a "hold memo." He summarized the 
facts of the case and petr's contentions, then concluded: 
l 
These claims are not insubstantial, but are better ad-
dressed on habeas corpus review. 
I will vote to DENY. 
, who had writ ten the pool memo, annotated the hold 
memo for you: 
Deny. The new practice in Texas--avoiding 5th Am ques-
tions by basing psychiatric testimony on "hypothetical" 
questions--will be challenged on habeas. ~ 
You underlined "habeas" and wrote "Yes" in the margin. Cert was 
denied on June 29, 1981. 
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D. Decisions Below 
Three months later petr filed his petn for state habeas. 
It took the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals only eight days to 
deny the writ. Two days later, petr sought federal habeas. 
On November 12, 1982, the DC (WD Tex; Bunton) denied the 
writ. Petr filed his notice of appeal. The DC granted his peti-
tion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and issued a certifi-
cate of probable cause. On December 8, however, while the appeal 
was still pending, the DC vacated its earlier stay of execution. 
On December 20 the State sought to cut off appellate 
review by scheduling petr's execution for January 25, 1983. Petr 
sought a stay from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals as soon as 
he learned that the execution had been scheduled. On January 7, 
the state court denied this stay. Petr then sought a stay from 
CA5. CA5 denied this stay summarily, without deciding the merits 
of petr's appeal. 
II. Discussion 
This case presents two important issues. Resolution of 
the first issue will have an important impact on the orderly ad-
ministration of capital cases in federal courts @ t offers this 
Court the opportunity to avoid the unseemly "last minute" rushes 
that have plagued it from time to time, and threaten to plague it 
even more in the future. 2: esolution of the second issue will be -----of particular importance in Texas, where the State is required to 
prove future dangerousness in order to justify the death penalty. 
• 
• 
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A. Standards for a Stay 
( 1) General Observations. It is clear that federal 
ha~ eas ~ re~ ently/4 b ~ n abused, both in capital cases and 
noncapital cases. Although these abuses have been well-
documented, and several sensible reform proposals have been pub-
lished,1 Congress has retained federal habeas in essentially the 
same form. Congress clearly intends to retain the remedy, appar-
ently believing that prisoners should have some access to federal 
courts to protect their federal rights. 
Furthermore, this Court relies on federal habeas to re-
lieve some of the pressure in difficult cases on direct appeal 
from state judgments. 2 I do not know how many times this year I 
have recommended denying cert in a case on direct appeal on the 
ground that any error could be corrected on federal habeas. This 
case, however, is a per feet example. Petr has a strong claim, 
but it involves a complicated factual record and technical medi-
cal evidence. The Court was entirely justified two years ago ( 
when it hoped that the lower federal courts would be able to sort 
out this mess without bothering us. 
The reliance placed on federal habeas, both by Congress 
------------ - -and this Court, requires that it be a meaningful remedy. It 
1Judge Friendly's proposals come readily to mind. 
2 In terms of sheer workload, the availability of successive 
habeas petns probably more than compensates for this factor. But 
the Court generally has little difficulty denying cert in these 
easy cases. When one focuses on hard cases--the cases involving 
real thought and effort--i t is convenient to be able to leave 
most of them to lower federal courts on habeas. 
~ 
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would be ludicrous for Congress to grant prisoners this powerful 
right, but allow States to make the right meaningless by execut-
ing the prisoners before their cases can be heard. It would be 
even worse for this Court to deny cert in difficult cases on the 
ground· that a remedy exists under federal habeas, but then allow 
the State to moot habeas proceedings while the case is still 
pending. 
This does not mean, of course, that a prisoner is auto-
matically entitled to a stay of execution whenever a habeas petn 
is pending. The availability of successive habeas petns would 
make this rule unworkable. The State has an interest in the or-
derly administration of justice, and that interest should be pro-
tected. The standards for a stay should accommodate both soci-
ety's interest in preserving a state prisoner's federal habeas ~ 
remedy and society's interest in the orderly administration of 
justice. 
In the next two sections, I present my suggestion for 
the appropriate standards. I recommend that these be announced ~ 5 
under the Court's supervisory powers over the lower federal ~. "1. 
courts rather than as a matter of constitutional or statutory 
law. 
(2) Standards on Initial Habeas. On an initial habeas, 
a stay should be granted as a matter of course while the petn or 
an appeal is pending. A prisoner has a right to have his federal 
claims reviewed in federal court, and this rule is the most effi-
• 
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cient way to protect this right. In most states, it is the rule 







exception to this rule: If the I 
substantially delayed the filing of his petn, he 
should be required to justify the delay. If there is some justi-
fication for the delay, a stay should be granted. If not, a stay 
should only be available under the higher standards imposed on 
subsequent habeas petns. See part II.A.3, infra. Thus a prison-
er who waits five years after exhausting state remedies should 
not receive a stay as a matter of course. He will be subjected 
to a higher standard • 
I had initially considered an addition~ xception, but 
Rives convinced me that it would not be a good idea. I had 
thought that there would be no need for a stay if a CA denied 
leave to appeal in forma pauperis, or denied a certificate of 
probable cause. My reasoning was that both of these events had 
the effect of dismissing the appeal. Thus the CA had finally 
re solved the appeal, and the case was no longer pending. As 
Rives pointed out, however, the prisoners in these cases can 
still seek cert in this Court. Thus they would seek stays pend-
ing the disposition of their cert petns. As a result, this Court 
would be forced to determine whether their cases might be cert-
worthy on a stay application rather than on the petn itself. De-
cisions would be made in a hurry, at the last minute, in an un-
seemly rush. I now agree that our interest in the orderly admin-
istration of justice is better served by disposing of these cases 
in the normal course of business rather than at the last minute. 
• 
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Since the Court invariably denies cert when a CA denies leave to 
appeal in forma pauperis or a certificate of probable cause, the 
rule will not significantly delay executions. It will make the 
process easier for the Court, and it will appear fairer to the 
public. 
(3) 
{ ~ ' 
Standards on 1'ubseguent Habeas. When a prisoner 
has already completed one round of federal habeas, and seeks to 
raise a new claim, 3 the burden should be on him to show why he 
did not raise his claim sooner. Tactical advantage would not be 
a sufficient justification. A change in the law might justify 
the delay, or newly discovered evidence that could not, with rea-
sonable diligence, have been discovered earlier, could be a suf-
ficient justification. 
If a prisoner can meet this burden, the court should 
treat the case as an inital habeas proceeding. But if the pris-
oner is unable to satisfy his burden, he should be subject to a 
higher standard. He should be required to show a likelihood of 
success on the merits. 4 Thus if he has what may be a valid 
claim--and the burden would be on him to show that he might have 
3If he seeks to raise the same claim, his petn can be dis-
missed summarily. If there has been a relevant change in the 
law, of course, he would effectively have a new claim. 
4Likelihood of success on the merits is a common element of 
tests to determine if equitable relief should be granted. A bal-
ancing of the equities is an element that often accompanies it. 
When the prisoner's life is in the balance, the equities clearly 
tip in his favor if he has a likelihood of success on the merits. 
\ 
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a valid claim--he would not be executed before that claim could 
be heard. 
Eleventh hour applications can be viewed as a special 
case of this rule. When a prisoner files an application for a 
stay shortly before he is scheduled to be executed, the burden 
should be on him to show--in addition to everything else--why he --
waited until the eleventh hour. If he has a val id excuse, the 
court may grant a temporary stay if necessary to have time to 
apply the above standards. But if there is no reason to justify 
waiting so long, the prisoner bears the risk that he will be un-
able to meet his burden to show likelihood of success on the mer-
its in the limited time available. 
(4) Advantages. If these standards are adopted, they 
should give lower courts (both CAs and DCs) guidance in dealing 
with capital cases. I recognize that these standards go well 
beyond what is necessary for the case before us, but I assume 
that is why the Court granted cert. In any event, I believe that 
Ir 
this broad "rule-making" is required here to avoid the problems r., 
- ~ 
we have seen as recently as Evans v. Alabama and Alabama v. Ev- -~ 
ans. ~ 
~~ 
These standards should also take this Court out of the -
business of reviewing claims on their merits at the last minu~ 
The Court will still have to consider applications for stays, but 
they will be in cases where a prisoner has already had one feder-
al habeas proceeding and was unable to justify his failure to 
raise his present claim at that time. The Court need not consid-
• 
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er the merits. It need only decide whether the case is cert-
worthy. The Court may still have to consider applications to 
vacate stays if States are impatient to execute people. But such 
applications should be much rarer when DCs and CAs no longer 
grant stays as a matter of course. They should only come in 
cases where lower courts have affirmatively found either (i) a 
justification for not bringing the claim sooner, or (ii) a like-
lihood of success on the merits of the prisoner's claim. I as-
sume that very few stays will need to be vacated under such cir-
cumstances. 
Finally, these standards should encourage an orderly, 
expeditious process in the federal courts. Prisoners have a 
strong incentive to bring all their federal claims early. There 9 ~ 
~ 
is a strong disincentive for piecemeal claims. Courts would gen- ~ 
erally be spared the unseemly task of making last-minute rulings '1"V 
~ 
on the merits. And this Court would be spared the necessity of 
reviewing the merits of every claim. 
(5) Application of the Standards. Applying the stand-
ards that I have suggested, it is clear that CA5 should have 
granted a stay in this case. This was petr's ~ t federal habe--
as proceeding, and he did not delay in bringing it. He filed his 





state habeas was filed almost immediately after this Court denied / ~v 
cert on his direct appeal. 
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To the extent this was an "eleventh hour" application 
for a stay, it is the State's fault. Petr sought a stay as soon 
as an execution was scheduled. 
Even if the standards were less generous than I suggest, 
CAS should have granted a stay here. If, for example, the Court 
accepts the "additional exception" that Rives convinced me to 
reject, see part II.A.2, supra, that exception would not apply. 
The DC had granted petr a certificate of probable cause. In 
fact, even under the standard that CAS purported to apply or 
under the standard I would find appropriate for subsequent habeas 
actions, a stay should have issued. Petr may not have a winning 
claim on the merits, but he at least has a "substantial likeli-
hood" of success. 
B. The "Hypothetical" Question 
Since CAS has not ruled on the merits of petr's claim, 
the Court may wish to reverse (on the stay question) and remand 
for consideration of the merits. I assume, however, that the 
decision to order the parties to brief the merits was deliberate, 
and that the Court intends to rule on the merits. 
In the final analysis, the resolution of the merits be-
comes a judgment call. In my view, use of the "hy pothetical" 
question was clearly unfair. The issue is whether it was unfair 
----------------.,. 
enough to be a constitutional violation. I think that it was. 
The medical evidence is overwhelming that psych ia tr ists are un-
able to predict long-term future dangerousness any more effec-
tively than a lay person. And to the extent that a psychiatrist 
yi 
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can predict long-term future dangerousness, he cannot do so with-
out examining the defendant. 5 The State has presented an "ex-
pert" to the jury and, in essence, asked that expert to answer 
one of the ultimate jury questions on the basis of his expertise. 
Since his expertise does not qualify him to answer that question, 
the jury has been awed into accepting evidence on a false basis. 
That, in my view, is a violation of due process. 6 
The State makes two specious arguments on the basis of 
the Coures prior cases. First, the State argues that Jurek v. 
Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976}, justifies the "hypothetical" testimo-
ny here. That argument is wrong. Jurek held that Texas may re-
quire a finding of future dangerousness before imposing the death 
penalty. The opinion you joined noted that the jury should "have 
before it all possible relevant information about the individual 
defendant whose fate it must determine." 428 U.S., at 276 (opin-
ion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.} (emphasis added}. 
There is no reason for the jury to have irrelevant information--
particularly when it is highly prejud ~ l. 
Second, the State argues that Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 
✓ 
( 
5This subject is well discussed in Joel 
amicus American Psychiatric Association. In 
ence we pay to ACOG in the abortion cases, I 
erence is due to APA in this case. 
Klein's brief for 
view of the defer-
think the same def-
6rn some States, admission of "hypothetical" psychiatric tes-
timony could well be harmless error in the appropriate circum-
stances. Since Texas law requires the State to prove future dan-
gerousness beyond a reasonable doubt, however, I do not see how 
the testimony here could possibly have been harmless. Cf. Zant 
v. Stephens, No. 81-89. 
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454 (1981), ere~ for it. Y'~ ents 
from forcing a defendant to submit to a psychiatric examination~ 
If this case prevents the State from using "hypothetical" evi-
dence, it will be unable to use any psychiatric evidence at all. 
This argument is irrelevant. To the extent that Smith prevents 
the State from using bad evidence (and Smith does nor foreclose 
the possibility entirely), that is no justification for using 
even worse evidence. And even if the two cases together had the 
effect of excluding all psychiatric testimony on this issue, that 
would not be a problem. The medical evidence indicates that such 
~ J testimony is worthless anyway. Why not exclude it? The State 
~ ~ yJl:: use lay actuarial evidence. In view of the analogies / 
~~-~  N Jurek, 428 U.S., at 275, and nn. 9-11 (bail, prison 
~ : ~ arole), this seems to have been what you had in mind 
yt,vv ~ -cime. 
~ As a final note, you may wish to consider the relation-
ship between this case and your opinion in Michael ~ nes v. Unit-
ed States, No. 81-5195. Mark informs me that you plan to include 
a footnote about the difficulty in predicting future dangerous-
ness on the basis of psychiatric testimony. In considering 
~ 
Jones, however, you should remember that the cases are very dif- ~ 
ferent. Here the consequences of the testimony are capital --
punishment--an irrevocable penalty different in kind from incar-
ceration. Our scrutiny should therefore be much more careful. 
Furthermore, in the commitment context, a psychiatrist need only 
be concerned with predicting short-term dangerousnesf. His task 
is thus more likely to be within his competence. If his predic-
~ 
bench memo:~ v. Estelle 
tion is wrong, it is still possible to 
make a new prediction. Finally, this case involves 
cal" testimony. Even if there is some value to psychiatric tes-
~ 
timony on the issue of long-term dangerousness, there is -He value 
to "hypothetical" psychiatric testimony. 
III. Conclusion 




The decision below should be reversed. Using its super-
visory powers, the Court should announce standards for lower 
courts to apply in deciding applications for stays of execution 
in capital cases. In essence, these standards should protect a 
prisoner's right to one federal habeas proceeding except in cases ------~--------~ '-" ~ - --- ._--
of unjustified delay in filing the petition. For subsequent ha-
beas proceedings, the - prisoner should be subject to a higher 
standard, such as likelihood of success on the merits, unless he 
can justify his failure to bring his claim earlier. 
On the merits of petr' s claim, the Court should vacp. te _ 
~ ~
the death sentence and remand for resentencing. The ~ ..ff "hy- ? 
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D.C. SuJ;>erior Court ~udg£..__Gl~d-
ys !.\~er ventured mto ·1n~ 
cre£ingly contentious legal-psychi-
atric thicket recently, ruling that 
government psychiatrists cannot 
offer prediction& about a defendant's 
future dangerousness in a civil com-· 
mitment proceeding. 
Kessler, head of the court's family 
division, ruled that "no psychiatric 
witness can reasonably offer an 'ex-
pert' opinion on this issue." 
'l'he U.S. Supreme Court is ex-
pected to set a standard soon for 
psychiatric testimony in the case of a 
Texas man sentenced to death for 
!.' the murder of a policeman. Defense 
attorneys are challenging the testi-
mony of two psychiatrists who of-
fered opinions on the man's danger-
ousness based on his prim criminal 
record. 
In a brief filed in that case, the 
American Psychiatric Association 
said last week that the "large body of 
research in this area indicates that, 
even under the best of conditions, 
psychiatric predictions of long-term 
future dangerousness are wrong in at 
least two out of every three cases." 
~· 
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1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
ID 
No. 82-6080 
THOMAS A. BAREFOOT, PETITIONER v. W. J. ~ ESTELLE, JR, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPART-
MENT OF CORRECTIONS 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF ~ /..c, 
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT <J,n-;;,,,. ,; _ ~
[May-, 1983] tJ ~ ~ 
JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the,Aourt. 
We have two questions before us in this cas~hether the ~ 
District Court erred on the merits in r~ting the petition d-lJ Y( uJ S' 
for habeas corpus filed by petitioner, arlt¥whether the Court ,.,, ,. .h j _ _ J,. 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit correctly denied a stay of exe-/ ~..--~ , 
Court's judgment. -
cution of the death penalty pending appeal of the District ~  
I lt) ,t,,f-4, 
On November 14, 1978, petitioner was convicted of the 
capital murder of a police officer in Bell County, Texas. A 
separate sentencing hearing before the same jury was then 
held to determine whether the death penalty should be im-
posed. Under Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. § 37.071, 1 two 
1 Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. § 37.071 provides: 
"(a) Upon a finding that the defendant is guilty of a capital offense, the 
court shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine whether 
the defendant shall be sentenced to death or life imprisonment. The pro-
ceeding shall be conducted in the trial court before the trial jury as soon as 
practicable. In the proceeding, evidence may be presented as to any mat-
ter that the court deems relevant to sentence. This subsection shall not be 
construed to authorize the introduction of any evidence secured in violation 
of the Constitution of the United States or the State of Texas. The state 






special questions were to be submitted to the jury: whether 
the conduct causing death was "committed deliberately and 
with reasonable expectation that the death of the deceased or 
another would result"; and whether "there is a probability 
that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence 
that would constitute a continuing threat to society." The 
state introduced into evidence petitioner's prior convictions 
and his reputation for lawlessness. The state also called two 
psychiatrists, John Holbrook and James Grigson, who, in re-
sponse to hypothetical questions, testified that petitioner 
would probably commit further acts of violence and represent 
a continuing threat to society. The jury answered both of 
the questions put to them in the affirmative, a result which 
required the imposition of the death penalty. 
On appeal to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, peti-
tioner urged, among other submissions, that the use of psy-
chiatrists at the punishment hearing to make predictions 
about petitioner's future conduct was unconstitutional be-
cause psychiatrists, individually and as a class, are not com-
petent to predict future dangerousness. Hence, their pre-
dictions are so likely to produce erroneous sentences that 
their use violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
It was also urged that, in any event, the permitting of an-
or against sentence of death. 
"(b) On conclusion of the presentation of the evidence, the court shall sub-
mit the following issues to the jury: 
"(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the de-
ceased was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation 
that the death of the deceased or another would result; 
"(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit crimi-
nal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society; 
"(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in kill-
ing the deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, 
by the deceased. 
"(c) The state must prove each issue submitted beyond a reasonable doubt, 
and the jury shall return a special verdict of 'yes' or 'no' on each issue 
submitted. 
The question specified in (b)(3) was not submitted to the jury. 
-
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swers to hypothetical questions by psychiatrists who had not 
personally examined petitioner was constitutional error. 
The court rejected all of these contentions and affirmed the 
conviction and sentence on March 12, 1980, 596 S. W. 2d 875; 
rehearing was denied on April 30, 1980. 
Petitioner's execution was scheduled for September 17, 
1980. On July 29, this Court granted a stay of execution 
pending the filing and disposition of a petition for certiorari, 
which was filed and then denied on June 29, 1981. 453 U. S. 
913. Petitioner's execution was again scheduled by the state 
courts, this time for October 13, 1981. An application for ha-
beas corpus to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was de-
nied on October 7, 1981. -- S.W. 2d --, whereafter a 
petition for habeas corpus was filed in the United States Dis-
. trict Court for the Western District of Texas. Among other 
issues, petitioner raised the same claims with respect to the 
use of psychiatric testimony that he had presented to the 
state courts. That court stayed petitioner's execution pend-
ing action on the petition. An evidentiary hearing was held 
on July 28, 1982, at which petitioner was represented by com-
petent counsel. On November 9, 1982, the District Court 
filed its findings and conclusions, rejecting each of the several 
grounds asserted by petitioner. The writ was accordingly 
denied; also, the stay of petitioner's death sentence was va-
cated. The District Court, however, granted petitioner's 
motion to proceed inf orrna pauperis and issued a certificate 
of probable cause pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2253, which pro-
vides that an appeal may not be taken to the Court of Ap-
peals from the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding 
where the detention complained of arises out of process is-
sued by a state court "unless the Justice or Judge who ren-
dered the order or a Circuit Justice or Judge issues a certifi-
cate of probable cause." Notice of appeal was filed on 
November 24, 1982. 
At this point, the Texas courts set January 25, 1983, as the 
new execution date. A petition for habeas corpus and mo-






Court of Criminal Appeals on December 21, 1982, and an-
other motion for stay of execution was denied by the same 
court on January 11, 1983. 
On January 14, petitioner moved the Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit to stay his execution pending consideration 
of his appeal from the denial of his petition for habeas corpus. 
On January 17, the parties were notified to present briefs and 
oral argument to the court on January 19. The case was 
heard on January 19, and on January 20 the Court of Appeals 
issued an opinion and judgment denying the stay. The 
court's opinion recited that the court had studied the briefs 
and record filed and had heard oral argument at which peti-
tioner's attorney was allowed unlimited time to discuss any 
matter germane to the case. The Court of Appeals was of 
the view that by giving the parties unlimited opportunity to 
brief and argue the merits as they saw fit, the requirements 
set forth in this Court's cases, such as Garrison v. Patterson, 
391 U. S. 464 (1968), Nowakowski v. Maroney, 386 U. S. 542 
(1967), and Carafas v. LaValle, 391 U. S. 234 (1968), were 
satisfied. As the court understood those cases, when a cer-
tificate of probable cause is issued by the District Court, the 
Court of Appeals must give the parties an opportunity to ad-
dress the merits. In its view, the parties had been given "an 
unlimited opportunity to make their contentions upon the un-
derlying merits by briefs and oral argument." The Court of 
Appeals then proceeded to address the merits of the psychi-
atric testimony issue, together with new claims not pre-
sented to the District Court, that the state court had no juris-
diction to resentence petitioner and that newly-discovered 
evidence warranted a new trial. Each of the grounds was 
discussed by the court and rejected. The court concluded 
that since the petition had no substantial merit, a stay should 
be denied. 
Petr then filed an application for stay of execution with the 
Circuit Justice for the Fifth Circuit, who referred the matter 






tioner's execution and, treating the application for stay as a 
petition for writ of certiorari before judgment, certiorari was 
granted. The parties were directed to brief and argue "the 
question presented by the application, namely, the appropri-
ate standard for granting or denying a stay of execution 
pending disposition of an appeal by a federal court of appeals 
by a death-sentenced federal habeas corpus petitioner, and 
also the issues on appeal before the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit." -- U. S. --. The case 
was briefed and orally argued here and we now affirm the 
judgment of the District Court. 
II 
With respect to the procedures followed by the Court of 
Appeals in refusing to stay petitioner's death sentence, it 
must be remembered that direct appeal is the primary ave-
nue for review of a conviction or sentence, and death penalty 
cases are no exception. When the process of direct review-
which, if a federal question is involved, includes the right to 
petition this Court for a writ of certiorari-comes to an end, a 
presumption of finality and legality attaches to the convictwn 
and sentence. The role of federal habeas proceedings, while 
important in assuring that constitutional rights are observed, 
is secondary and limited. Federal courts are not forums in 
which to relitigate state trials. Even less is federal habeas a 
means by which a defendant is entitled to delay ab execution 
indefinitely. The procedures adopted to facilitate the or-
derly consideration and disposition of habeas petitions are not 
legal entitlements that a defendant has a right to pursue irre-
spective of the contribution these procedures make toward 
uncovering constitutional error. "It is natural that counsel 
for the condemned in a capital case should lay hold of every 
ground which, in their judgment, might tend to the advan-
tage of their client, but the administration of justice ought 
not to be interfered with on mere pretexts." Lambert v. 







term of years, a death sentence cannot begin to be carried out 
by the state while substantial legal issues remain outstand-
ing. Accordingly, federal courts must isolate the excep-
tional cases where constitutional error requires retrial or re-
sentencing as certainly and swiftly as orderly procedures will 
permit. They need not, and should not, however, fail to give 
non-frivolous claims of constitutional error the careful atten-
tion that they deserve. 
For these reasons, we granted certiorari before judgment 
to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in refusing 
to stay petitioner's death sentence. 
A 
Petitioner urges that the Court of Appeals improperly de-
nied a stay of execution while failing to act finally on his ap-
peal. He suggests the possibility of remanding the case to 
the Court of Appeals without reaching the merits of the Dis-
trict Court's judgment. The heart of petitioner's submission 
is~ als, unless its 5elievesthe cas e to be 
entirely frivolous, was obligated to decide the appeal on its 
merits in the usual cours n mus , m a ea case, stay the 
execution pending such disposition. The State responds that 
the Court of Appeals reached and decided the merits of the 
issues presented in the course of denying the stay and that 
petitioner had ample opportunity to address the merits. 
We have previously held that "[i]f an appellant persuades 
an appropriate tribunal that probable cause for an appeal ex-
ists, he must then be afforded an opportunity to address the 
underlying merits." Garrison v. Patterson, 391 U. S. 464, 
466 (1968) (per curiam); Nowakowski v. Maroney, 386 U. S. 
542 (1967); Cara/as v. Lavalle, 391 U. S. 243 (1968). These 
decisions indicate that if a court of appeals is unable to re-
solve the merits of an appeal before the scheduled date of 
execution, the petitioner is entitled to a stay of execution to 
permit due consideration of the merits. But we have also 
held that the requirement of a decision on the merits "does 
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not prevent the courts of appeals from adopting appropriate 
summary procedures for final disposition of such cases." 
Carafas v. Lavalle, supra, at 242; Garrison v. Patterson, 
supra, at 446. In Garrison, after examining our prior hold-
ings, we concluded that 
"Nothing in [these cases] prevents the courts of appeals 
from considering the questions of probable cause and the 
merits together, and nothing said there or here necessar-
ily requires full briefing in every instance in which a cer-
tificate is granted. We hold only that where an appeal 
possesses sufficient merit to warrant a certificate, the 
appellant must be afforded adequate opportunity to ad-
dress the merits, and that if a summary procedure is 
adopted the appellant must be informed by rule or other-
wise, that his opportunity will be limited. "391 U. S. at 
446--447. 
We emphasized, id., that there must be ample evidence that 
in disposing of the appeal, the merits have been addressed, 
but that nothing in the cases or the applicable rules prevents 
a Court of Appeals from adopting summary procedures in 
such cases. 
On the surface, it is not clear whether the Fifth Circuit's 
recent practice of requiring a showing of some prospect of 
success on the merits before issuing a stay of execution, 
O'Bryan v. Estelle, 691 F. 2d 706, 708 (1982); Brooks v. Es-
telle, -- F. 2d -- (1982), comports with these require-
ments. Approving the execution of a defendant before his 
appeal is decided on the merits would clearly be improper 
under Garrison , Nowakowski, and Carafas. However, a 
practice of deciding the merits of an appeal, when possible, 
together with the application for a stay, is not inconsistent 
with our cases. 
It appears clear that the Court of Appeals in this case pur-
sued the latter course. The Court of Appeals was fully 
aware of our precedents and ruled that their requirements 
Fr _ 
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were fully satisfied. After quoting from Garrison, the Court 
of Appeals said: 
"Our actions here fall under this language. Petitioner's 
motion is directed solely to the merits. The parties 
have been also offered an unlimited opportunity to make 
their contentions upon the underlying merits and oral ar-
gument. This opinion demonstrates the reasons for our 
decision." 
In a section of its opinion entitled "Merits of Appeal: Psychi-
atric Testimony on Dangerousness," the Court of Appeals 
then proceeded to address that issue and reject petitioner's 
contentions. 
The course pursued by the Court of Appeals in this case 
was within the bounds of our prior decisions. In connection 
with acting on the stay, the parties were directed to file 
briefs and to present oral argument. In light of the Fifth 
Circuit's announced practice, O'Bryan v. Estelle, 691 F. 2d 
706, 708 (1982); Brooks v. Estelle, - F. 2d - (1982), it 
was clear that whether a stay would be granted depended on 
the probability of success on the merits. The parties ad-
dressed the merits and were given unlimited time to present 
argument. We do not agree that petitioner and his attor-
neys were prejudiced in their preparation of the appeal. 
The primary issue presented had been briefed and argued 
throughout the proceedings in the state courts and rebriefed 
and reargued in the district court's habeas corpus proceed-
ing. From the time the district court ruled on the petition 
on November 9, 1982, petitioner had 71 days in which to pre-
pare the briefs and arguments which were presented to the 
Fifth Circuit on January 19, 1983. 
Although the Court of Appeals did not formally affirm the ,, 
judgment of the district court, there is no question that the 
Court of Appeals ruled on the merits of the appeal, as its con-
cluding statements demonstrate: 







"This Court has had the benefit of the full trial record ex-
cept for a few exhibits unimportant to our consideration. 
- _ We have read the arguments and materials filed by the 
parties. The petitioner is represented here, as he has 
been throughout the habeas corpus proceedings and in 
state and federal courts, by a competent attorney experi-
enced in this area of the law. We have heard full argu-
ments in open court. Finding no patent substantial 
merit, or semblance thereof, to petitioner's constitu-
tional objections, we must conclude and order that the 
motion for stay should be DENIED." 
It would have been advisable, once the court had addressed I 
the merits and arrived at these conclusions, to verify the ob- &f./L 
vious by expressly affirming the judgment of the District O 
Court, as well as to deny the stay. The court's failure to do 
so, however, does not conflict with Garrison and related 
cases. Indeed, in Garrison itself, the Court noted that "in 
an effort to determine whether the merits had been ad-
dressed ... this Court solicited further submissions from the 
parties in the case." 391 U. S., at 466. If a formal decision 
on the merits were required, this inquiry would have been 
pointless. Moreover, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted 
for not formally affirming the judgment of the District Court 
since this Court, over the dissent of three Justices arguing as 
petitioner does here, refused to stay an execution in a case 
where the Court of Appeals followed very similar proce-
dures. Brooks v. Estelle, -- U. S. -- (1982). 2 
Although the Court of Appeals moved swiftly to decide the 
stay, this does not mean that its treatment of the merits was 
cursory or inadequate. On the contrary, the court's resolu-
tion of the primary issue on appeal, the admission of psychi-
2 In that case, we treated the application for stay as a petition for certio-
rari or in the alternative as a petition for certiorari challenging the merits 
of the Court of Appeals' decision. We denied the petition on either as-






atric testimony on dangerousness, reflects careful consider-
ation. For these reasons, to remand to the Court of Appeals 
for verification that the judgment of the District Court is af-
firmed would be an unwarranted exaltation of form over 
substance. 
B 
That the Court of Appeals' handling of this case was ~ 
y abie under our precedents is not to suggest that its course 
should be f.i'ccepted as the norm or § the preferred proce-
dure. It ~ matter of public record that an increasing num-
ber of death-sentenced petitioners are entering the appellate 
stages of the federal habeas process. The fair and efficient 
consideration of these appeals requires proper procedures for 
the handling of applications for stays of executions and de-
mands procedures that allow a decision on the merits of an 
appeal accompanying the denial of a stay. The development 
of these procedures is primarily a function of the courts of ap-
peals and the rulemakin rocesses of the federal courts, but 
~~-w-Jt. 
the following en era · deline can be set forth. 
First. Congress establishe he requirement that a pris-
oner obtain a certificate of probable cause to appeal in order 
to prevent frivolous appeals from delaying the States' ability 
to impose sentences, including death sentences. The pri-
mary means of separating meritorious from frivolous appeals 
should be the decision to grant or withhold a certificate of 
probable cause. It is generally agreed that "probable cause 
requires something more than the absence of frivoloity, and 
that the standard is a higher one than the 'good faith' require-
ment of Sec. 1915." Blackmun, "Allowance of In Forma 
Pauperis Appeals in Sec. 2255 and Habeas Corpus Cases," 43 
F.R.D. 343, 352 (CA 8 1967). We agree with the weight of j 
opinion in the courts of appeals that a certificate of probable 
cause requires petitioner to make a "substantial showing of 
the denial of [a] federal right." Stewart v. Beto, 454 F. 2d 







See also Ramsey v. Hand, 309 F. 2d 947, 948 (CA 10 1962); 
Goode v. Wainurright, 670 F. 2d 941 (CA 111982). 3 In a cap-
ital case, the nature of the penalty is a proper consideration 
in determining whether to issue a certificate of probable 
cause, but the severity of the penalty does not in itself suffice 
to warrant the automatic issuing of a certificate. 
Second. When a certificate of probable cause is issued by 
the district court, as it was in this case, or later by the court 
of appeals, petitioner must then be afforded an opportunity 
to address the merits, and the court of appeals is obligated to 
decide the merits of the appeal. Accordingly, a circuit court, 
where necessary to prevent the case from becoming moot by 
the petitioner's execution, should grant a stay of execution 
pending disposition of an appeal when a condemned prisoner 
obtains a certificate of probable cause on his initial habeas 
appeal. 
Third. As our earlier cases have indicated, a court of ap-
peals may adopt expedited procedures in resolving the merits 
of habeas appeals, notwithstanding the issuance of a certifi-
cate of probable cause. If a circuit chooses to follow this 
course, it would be advisable to promulgate a local rule stat-
ing the manner in which such cases will be handled and in-
forming counsel that the merits of an appeal may be decided 
upon the motion for a stay. Even without special proce-
dures, it is entirely appropriate that an appeal which is "friv-
olous and entirely without merit" be dismissed after the hear-
ing on a motion for a stay. Local Rule 20, Court of Appeals 
3 The following quotation cogently sums up this standard: 
"In requiring a 'question of some substance', or a 'substantial showing of 
the denial of [a] federal right', obviously the petitioner need not show that 
he should prevail on the merits. He has already failed in that endeavor. 
Rather, he must demonstrate that the issues are debatable among jurists 
of reason; that a court could resolve the issues [in a different manner]; or 
that the questions are 'adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed fur-
ther.' " United Swtes ex rel. Jones v. Richmond, 245 F. 2d 234 (CA2), 
cert. denied, 355 U. S. 846 (1957). 
I 
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for the Fifth Circuit. We caution that the issuance of a cer-
tificate of probable cause generally should indicate that an 
appeal is not legally frivolous, and that a court of appeals 
should be confident that petitioner's claim is squarely fore-
closed by a holding of this Court or is lacking any factual 
basis in the record of the case before dismissing it as 
frivolous. 
If an appeal is not frivolous, a court of appeals may still 
choose to expedite briefing and hearing the merits of all or of 
selected cases in which a stay of a death sentence has been 
requested, provided that counsel has adequate opportunity to 
address the merits and knows that he is expected to do so. 
If appropriate notice is provided, argument on the merits 
may be heard at the same time the motion for a stay is consid-
ered, and the court may thereafter render a single opinion 
deciding both the merits and the motion, unless exigencies of 
time preclude a considered decision on the merits, in which 
case the motion for a stay must be granted. In choosing the 
procedures to be used, the courts should consider whether 
the delay that is avoided by summary procedures warrants 
departing from the normal, untruncated processes of appel-
late review. In instances where expedition of the briefing I 
and argument schedule is not ordered, a court of appeals may ~ 
nevertheless choose to advance capital cases on the docket so O 
that the decision of these appeals is not delayed by the weight 
of other business. 
Fourth. Second and successive federal habeas corpus peti- / j//,Pv 
tions present a different issue. "To the extent that these in- f 
volve the danger that a condemned inmate might attempt to 
use repeated petitions and appeals as a mere delaying tactic, 
the State has a quite legitimate interest in preventing such 
abuses of the writ." Brief of Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal 
Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. 41. Rule 9 of the Rules 
Governing § 2254 Cases states that "a second or successive 
petition may be dismissed if the judge finds that it fails to al-
lege new or different grounds for relief ... [or if] the failure 
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of the petitioner to assert those grounds in a prior petition 
constituted an abuse of the writ." Even where it cannot be 
concluded that a petition should be dismissed under Rule 9, it 
would be proper for the district court to expedite consider-
ation of the petition. The granting of a stay should reflect 
the presence of substantial grounds upon which relief might 
be granted. 
Fifth. Stays of exe ution are not automatic pending the fil-
ing and consideration of a pe 1 10n or a writ of certiorari from 
this Court to the Court of Appeals which has denied a writ of 
habeas corpus. It is well-established that "there must be a 
reasona"6fe p robability that four members of the Court would 
consider the underlying issue sufficiently meritorious for the 
grant of certiorari or the notation of probable jurisdiction; 
there must be a significant possibility of reversal of the lower 
court's decision; and there must be a likelihood that irrepara-
ble harm will result if that decision is not stayed." White v. 
Florida, -- U. S. -- (POWELL, J., Circuit Justice). 
Application for stays of death sentences are expected to con-
tain the information and materials necesary to make an as-
sessment of the merits of the issue and so to determine 
whether plenary review and a stay are warranted. A stay of 
execution should first be sought from the Court of Appeals, 
and this Court generally places considerable weight on the 
decision reached by the circuit courts in these circumstances. 
III 
Petitioner's merits submission is that his death sentence 
must be set as~ the Constitution of the United 
States barred the testimony of the two psychiatrists who tes-
tified against him at the punishment hearing. There are 
several aspects to this claim. First, it is urged that psychia-
trists, individually and as a group, are incompetent to predict 
with an acceptable degree of reliability that a particular crim-
inal will commit other crimes in the future and so represent a 






event, psychiatrists should not be permitted to testify about 
future dangerousness in response to hypothetical questions 
and without having examined the defendant personally. 
Third, it is argued that in the particular circumstances of 
this case, the testimony of the psychiatrists was so unreliable 
that the sentence should be set aside. As indicated below, 
we reject each of these arguments. 
A 
The suggestion that no psychiatrist's testimony may be 
presented with respect to a defendant's future dangerousness 
is somewhat like asking us to disinvent the wheel. In the 
first place, it is contrary to our cases. If the likelihood of a 
defendant committing further crimes is a constitutionally ac-
. ceptable criterion for imposing the death penalty, which it is, 
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U. S. 262 (1976), and if it is not impossi-
ble for even a lay person sensibly to arrive at that conclusion, 
it makes little sense, if any, to submit that psychiatrists, out 
of the entire universe of persons who might have an opinion 
on the issue, would know so little about the subject that they 
should not be permitted to testify. In Jurek, seven Justices 
rejected the claim that it was impossible to predict future be-
havior and that dangerousness was therefore an invalid con-
sideration in imposing the death penalty. JUSTICE STEVENS 
responded directly to the argument, 428 U. S., at 27 4-276: 
"It is, of course, not easy to preduct future behavior. 
The fact that such a determination is difficult, however, 
does not mean that it cannot be made. Indeed, predic-
tion of future criminal conduct is an essential element in 
many of the decisions rendered throughout our criminal 
justice system. The decision whether to admit a de-
fendant to bail, for instance, must often turn on a judge's 
prediction of the defendant's future conduct. Any sen-
tencing authority must predict a convicted person's 
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of determining what punishment to impose. For those 
sentenced to prison, these same predictions must be 
made by parole authorities. The task that a Texas jury 
must perform in answering the statutory question in 
issue is thus basically no different from the task per-
formed countless times each day throughout the Ameri-
can system of criminal justice. What is essential is that 
the jury have before it all posible relevant information 
about the individual defendant whose fate it must deter-
mine. Texas law clearly assures that all such evidence 
will be adduced." 
Although there was only lay testimony with respect to dan-
gerousness in Jurek, there was no suggestion by the Court 
that the testimony of doctors would be inadmissable. To the 
contrary, the Court said that the jury should be presented 
with all of the relevant information. Furthermore, in Es: 
telle v. Smith, 451 U. S. 454, 473 (1981), in the face ofasub-
mi'ss1on very similar to that presented in this case with re-
spect to psychiatric testimony, we apJ!rovingly repeateg_ the I 
above quotation from Jurek and went on to say that we were 
in '~g the use of psychiatric testimony 
bearing on future dangerousness". See also California v. 
Ramos, -- U.S.--, -- (1983); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 
U. S. 153, 203-204 (1976) (plurality opinion) (desirable to al-
low open and far-ranging argument that places as much in-
formation as possible before the jury). 
Acceptance of petitioner's position that expert testimony 
about future dangerousness is far too unreliable to be 
admissable would immediately call into question those other 
contexts in which predictions of future behavior are con-
stantly made. For example, In O'Connor v. Donalson, 422 
U. S. 563, 576 (1975), we held that a non-dangerous civil com-
mittee could not be held in confinement against his will. 
Later, speaking about the requirements for civil commit-






"There may be factual issues in a commitment proceed-
ing, but the factual aspects represent only the beginning 
of the inquiry. Whether the individual is mentally ill 
and dangerous to either himself or others and is in need 
of confined therapy turns on the meaning of the facts 
which must be interpreted by expert psychiatrists and 
psychologists." Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418, 429 
(1979). 
In the second place, the rules of evidence generally extant 
at the federal and state levels anticipate that relevant, un-
privileged evidence should be admitted and its weight left to 
the fact finder, who would have the benefit of cross examina-
tion and contrary evidence by the opposing party. Psychi- ( 
atr~ timony _predicting dangerousness may be countered 
. not only as erroneous 1 n a articular case but as generally so 
unre a e that 1t shoul be ignored. If the jury may make 
up its min a ou ure angerousness unaided by psychi-
atric testimony, jurors should not be barred from hearing the 
views of the state's psychiatrists along with opposing views 
of the defendant's doctors. 
Third, petitioner's view mirrors the position expressed in 
the amicus brief of the American Psychiatric Association 
(APA). As indicated above, however, the same view was 
presented and rejected in Estelle v. Smith. We are no more 
convinced now that the view of the AP A should be converted 
into a constitutional rule barring an entire category of expert 
testimony. We are not persuaded that such testimony is al-
most entirely unreliable and that the fact finder and the ad-
versary system will not be competent to uncover, recognize, 
and take due account of its shortcomings. 
The amicus does not suggest that there are not other 
views held by members of the association or of the profession 
generally. Indeed, as this case and others indicate, there 
are those doctors who are quite willing to testify at the sen-






what they are talking about, and who expressly disagree 
with the Association's point of view. Furthermore, their 
qualifications as experts are regularly accepted by the courts. 
If they are so obviously wrong and should be discredited, 
there should be no insuperable problem in doing so by calling 
members of the association who are of that view and who con-
fidently assert that opinion in their amicus brief. Neither 
petitioner nor the association suggests that psychiatrists are 
always wrong with respect to future dangerousness, only 
most of the time. Yet the submission is that this category of 
testimony should be excised entirely from all trials. We are 
unconvinced, however, at least as of now, that the adversary 
process cannot be trusted to sort out the reliable from the un-
relia e eVI ence an opmion about ture dangerousness, 
particularlywhen the convicted felon has the opportunity to 
present his own side of the case. 
We are unaware of and have been cited to no case, federal 
or state, that has adopted the categorical views of the associ-
ation. 4 Certainly it was presented and rejected at every 
•Petitioner relies on Peo-ple v. Murtishaw, -- Cal. 3d --, 175 Cal. 
Rptr. 738, 631 P. 2d 446. There the California Supreme Court held that in 
light of the general unreliability of such testimony, admitting medical testi-
mony concerning future dangerousness was error in the context of a sen-
tencing proceeding under the California capital punishment statutes. The 
court observed that "the testimony of [the psychiatrist was] not relevant to 
any of the listed factors" which the jury was to consider in deciding 
whether to impose the death penalty." 631 P. 2d, at 469. The court dis-
tinguished cases, however, where "the trier of fact is required by statute to 
determine whether a person is 'dangerous'", in which event "expert testi-
mony, unreliable though it may be, is often the only evidence available to 
assist the trier of fact." Ibid. Furthermore, the court acknowledged 
"that despite the recognized general unreliability of predictions concerning 
future violence, it may be possible for a party in a particular case to show 
that a reliable prediction is possible. . . . A reliable prediction might also 
be conceivable if the defendant had exhibited a long-continued pattern of 
criminal violence such that any knowledgeable psychiatrist would antici-






stage of the present proceeding. After listening to the two 
schools of thought testify not only generally but about the pe-
titioner and his criminal record, the District Court found: 
"The majority of psychiatric experts agree that where 
there is pattern of repetitive assault and violent conduct, 
the accuracy of psychiatric predictions of future danger-
ousness dramatically rises. The accuracy of this conclu-
sion is reaffirmed by the expert medical testimony in the 
case at the evidentiary hearing. . . . It would appear 
that petitioner's complaint is not the diagnosis and pre-
diction made by Drs. Holbrook and Grigson at the pun-
ishment phase of his trial, but that Dr. Grigson ex- 1 
pressed extreme certainty in his diagnosis and 
prediction. . . . In any event, the differences among 
the ~e~ were quanti~tive, not qualitative. The dif-
ferencesinopinfcmgofo the weight of the evidence and 
not the admissibility of such testimony. . . . Such dis-
putes are within the province of the jury to resolve. In-
deed, it is a fundamental premise of our entire system of 
criminal jurisprudence that the purpose of the jury is to 
sort out the true testimony from the false, the important 
matters from the unimportant matters, and, when called 
upon to do so, to give greater credence to one party's ex-
pert witnesses than another's. Such matters occur rou-
tinely in the American judicial system, both civil and 
criminal." J.A. 13 (footnote omitted). 
way indicate that its holding was based on constitutional grounds. 
Petitioner also relies on White v. Estelle , 554 F. Supp. 851 (S.D. Tex. 
1982). The court in that case did no more than express "serious reserva-
tions" about the use of psychiatric predictions based on hypotheticals in in-
stances where the doctor has had no previous contact with the defendant. 
Id., at 858. The actual holding of the case, which is totally irrelevant to 
the issues here, was that the testimony of a doctor who had interviewed 
the defendant should have been excluded, because, prior to the interview, 
the defendant had not been given Miranda warnings or an opportunity to 








We agree with the trial judge, as well as with the Court of 
Appeals' judges who dealt with the merits of the issue and 
agreed with the trial court in this respect. 
B 
Whatever the decision may be about the use of psychiatric 
testimony, in general, on the issue of future dangerousness, 
petitioner urges that such testimony must be based on per-
sonal examination of the defendant and may not be given in 
response to hypothetical questions. We disagree. Expert 
testimony, whether in the form of an opinion based on hypo-
thetical questions or otherwise, is commonly admitted as evi-
dence where it might help the fact finder do its assigned job. 
As the Court said long ago, Spring Co. v. Edgar, 99 U. S. 
645, 657 (1878): 
Men who have made questions of skill or science the ob-
ject of their particular study, says Phillips, are compe-
tent to give their opinions in evidence. Such opinions 
ought, in general, to be deduced from facts that are not 
disputed, or from facts given in evidence; but the author 
proceeds to say that they need not be founded upon their 
own personal knowledge of such facts, but may be 
founded upon the statement of facts proved in the case. 
Medical men, for example, may give their opinions not 
only to the state of a patient they may have visited, or as 
to cause of the death of a person whose body they have 
examined or as to the nature of the instruments which 
caused the wounds they have examined, but also in cases 
where they have not themselves seen the patient, and 
have only heard the symptoms and particulars of his 
state detailed by other witnesses at the trial. Judicial 
tribunals have in many instances held that medical works 
are not admissible, but they everywhere hold that men 
skilled in science, art, or particular trades may give their 







See also Dexter v. Hall , 15 Wall. 9, 26-27 (1872); Forsythe v. 
Doolittle, 120 U. S. 73, 78 (1877); Bram v. United States, 168 
U. s. 532, 568--569 (1897). 
Today, in the federal system, the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, §§ 702-706, provide for the testimony of experts. 
The advisory committee notes touch on the particular objec-
tions to hypothetical questions, but none of these caveats 
lend any support to petitioner's constitutional arguments. 
Furthermore, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals could find 
no fault with the mode of examining the two psychiatrists 
under Texas law: 
"The trial court did not err by permitting the doctors to 
testify on the basis of the hypothetical question. The 
use of hypothetical questions is a well-established prac-
tice. 2 C. McCormick and R. Ray, Texas Evidence, 
§ 1402 (2d ed. 1956). That the experts had not examined 
appellant went to the weight of their testimony, not to 
its admissability." 596 S.W. 2d 875, 887. 
Like the Court of Criminal Appeals, the District Court, 
and the Court of Appeals, we reject petitioner's constitu-
tional arguments against the use of hypothetical questions. 
Although cases such as this involve the death penalty, we 
perceive no constitutional barrier to applying the ordinary 
rules of evidence governing the use of expert testimony. 
C 
As we understand petitioner, he contends that even if the 
use of hypothetical questions in predicting future dangerous-
ness is acceptable as a general rule, the use made of them in 
his case violated his right to due process of law. For exam-
ple, petitioner insists that the doctors should not have been 
permitted to give an opinion on the ultimate issue before the 
jury, particularly when the hypothetical questions were 
phrased in terms of petitioner's own conduct; 5 that the hypo-






thetical questions referred to unproven facts; and that the an-
swers to the questions were so positive as to be assertions of 
fact and not opinion. These claims of misuse of the hypo-
thetical questions, as well as others, were rejected by the 
Texas courts, and neither the District Court nor the Court of 
Appeals found any constitutional infirmity in the application 
of the Texas Rules of Evidence in this particular case. We 
agree. 
IV 
In sum, we affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
There is no doubt that the psychiatric testimony was very 
prejudicial to petitioner, but that does not make that evi-
dence inadmissable, any more than may be true of other par-
ticularly telling evidence against any defendant in a criminal 
case. At bottom, to agree with petitioner's basic position 
would seriously undermine and in effect overrule Jurek v. 
Texas. Petitioner conceded as much at oral argument. Tr. 
of Oral Arg. 2~25. We are not inclined at this time, how-
ever to overturn the decision in that case. 
The judgment of the District Court is 
Affirmed. 
Spaulding, 293 U. S. 498, 506 (1935), but it does not appear that from what 
the Court there said that the rule was rooted in the Constitution. In any 
event, we note that the Advisory Committee notes to Rule 704 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence state as follows: 
"The basic approach to opinions, lay and expert, in these rules is to admit 
them when helpful to the trier of fact. In order to render this approach 
fully effective and to allay any doubt on the subject, the so-called 'ultimate 
issue' rule is abolished by the instant rule." 
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Barefoot v. Estelle, No. 82-6080 
JUSTICE WHITE's draft in this case is essentially 
strong, but it does have some problems. It appears that your 
vote will be necessary for a majority, so you are in a good posi-
tion to make suggestions. 
Part II.A, pp. 6-10, strikes me as an unnecessary and 
~..z ===-=- ~ 
unconvincing attempt to justify what the Court did in Brooks v. u) Estelle by endorsing what CAS did here. It is unnecessary, for 
~ Court tfWj.ustify its own actions
1 
in Brooks without endorsing 
?"".: c~ A~ procedural question, for example, was not presented 
~ o the Court in Brooks. Moreover, it is well established that 
this Court's denial of cert does not indicate a view on the mer-
, 
its. And it is unconvincing because the draft as a whole makes 
✓ . 
clear that a CA must rule on the merits. Although there can be 
little question what CAS's view on the merits would have been, it 
is also clear thatJ A5 was unwilling to make its ruling on the 
merits. .µ>/li 
(J;> ,(/)iJt II.B, pp. 10-13, is generally helpful, but I think 
you ~ d focus on the fifth general guideline, p. 13. JUSTICE 
--fh.v 5& TE states, in accordance with sett_led law, that a stay of exe-
c, f-~ ution pending dispositi : of a cert petn is not automatic in a 
VV' V- death case--even w~ is on his first trip through federal 
~ - I ~hR~ no problem w~tJi,J;.h1s as a statement of existing 
. {µ~ ~ µ·-k> 
~--~ 'A-_.-r~~~~ ~ 
'"[J,~ 9 ~ ,~ ✓-  
~ 
,. - - 2. 
legal principle, but the Court may wish to reconsider the rule 
here. The effect of JUSTICE WHITE's guideline is to force this 'U.-&> 
Court to determine whether capital cases might be cert-worthy on 
a stay application rather than on the petn itself. Decisions 
must be made in a hurry, at the last minute, in an unseemly rush. 
It seems that our interest in the orderly administration of jus-
tice is better served by disposing of these cases in the normal 
course of business rather than at the last minute. If the Court 
later grants cert, a stay is unquestionably appropriate. But 
even if the Court later denies cert, an automatic stay on the 
first trip through federal habeas will not delay the State's pro-
cesses unduly. What little delay the stay produces will be bal-
anced by making the process easier for the Court, and making it 
appear fairer to the public. {The balance would be different, of 
course, for a subsequent habeas petn unless there was a good rea- ~ 
habeas petn.) 
beginning of Part III.A, pp. 




- - 3 • 
16, and this ~ r~ u;;rt is applicable to the contention that petr 
actually ma~~hould stick with that argument. 
I JJ~ ~ ere is also a problem with Part III.C, pp. 20-21. 
~ ICE WHITE simply summarizes petr's argument, points out that 
the lower courts rejected it, and declares "We agree." If the 
argument is so frivolous that it can be dismissed without discus-
sion, it should be relegated to a footnote. I do not think the 
argument is so frivolous, and suggest some explanation of why it 
is mer i tless. is 
by the courts below. 
tire tone of Part 
~ 
--... 
CHAMBE RS OF 
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JU S T IC E J OHN PAUL STEVENS C4L~ 
May 31, 1983 
Re: 82-6080 - Barefoot v. Estelle 
Dear Byron: 
Except for Part II =f. , I agree in substance with 
what you have written. It seems to me, however, that 
II-A is both inconsistent with the remai nder of the 
opinion and unnecessary. Parts II-Band III 
demonstrate that the Court of AppeaL s err ea in 1 his 
c~ _in ~ ~ ~s: it shouldn ave granted a stay of 
execuE1.on untiL it decided the merits of the appeal, 
and it overstated the case when it said that there was 
no semblance of merit in the prisoner's claims. Yet )? 
Part II-A hints that the failure to enter a final 
judgment is nothing but a procedural technicality. 
This does not suggest any disagreement with your 
ultimate disposition of the case. _As you state, the 
fact · t hat the Court of Appeals erred : in failing to act 
on the merits of the case before tne ~petitioner was 
executed does not automatically require a remand. All 
it r e quires is that some court decide the merits before 
tne s a we en er e is i te • Since we ecide the 
merits in Part III, the procedural er ror comm it t ed by 
t=,als will be demonstrably irrelevant as 
of the issuance of our mandate. I don't know whether 
the proper terminology is harmless procedural error or 
mootness, but our disposition obviously makes remand 
unnec e ssary. 
I wonder if it would not remove the internal 
tension in the opinion to move the substance of your 
conclusion in Part II-A to the end of the opinion. In 
that manner, the opinion would begin with a statement 
of what the correct procedure is, continue to an 
analysis of the merits, and conclude with an 
_explanation of what the correct disposition of this 
-case is. With the possible exception of a few 
relatively minor points, I believe I could join 
.,,- --
- --2-
something along those lines. If you leave the 
discussion in its present form, I will write separately 
because I feel very strongly that a Court of Appeals 
should never let a case become moot by reason of th e g./- d,d 
execution of one of the litigants when it has an I~ 
obligation to decide the merits of the appeal before ~~ 
the execution takes place . ~ . 
One final point : Brooks v. Estelle may be 
distinguished on the ground that there was not even 
arguable merit in the petitioner's claim. Even though 
I agree with you that we must reject the claim here , 
surely we cannot say that the merits contentions in 
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cci ~ The Conference 
Sin("'ereJy, 
-
June 6, 1983 
82-6080 Barefoot v. Estelle 
Dear Byron: 
- - I am writing a join note separately, as I agree 
essentially with your opinion. 
I do not agree wit~ John's view that Part II-A is 
"inconsistent with the remainder of the opinion". Part II-
A, as John suggests (letter of May 31) perhaps is "unneces-
sary" as this Court's action in Brooks can be justified on 
its own. I would not object if you decided - in order to 
obtain John's vote - to move the ~ubstance of the concluding 
portions of Part II-A to the end of the opinion. As you 
suggest, it was unfortunate and ~oor practice not to use the 
appropriate words ruling on the merits. It is clear, howev-
er, that in substance this is exactly what CA5 did. 
Your proposed general guidelines are constructive. 
I do have a suggestion as to the ."fifth". I agree that 
stays of executi.on should not be "automatic" even "fhen a 
petition for cert is being filed in the first federal habeas 
corpus case. Almost invariably, I have granted a stay in 
such a situation. On the first habeas review, I think our 
normal practice has been to take a close look at the peti.-
tion. It may be well to say this in substance, making clear 
as you have that this is not automatic. 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY o'cONNOR 
June 7, 1983 
No. 82-6080 Barefoot v. Estelle 
Dear Byron, 
Please join me in your opinion. 
I understand John's concerns and if you 
decide to make changes to accommodate his views, 
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June 7, 1983 
Re: 82-6080 - Bare f oot v. Es t elle 
Dear John, 
In t ardy re sponse to your letter about the 
circulating draft, I would much prefer, if there are 
four other votes in support, to leave the proposed 
opinion as it is. You suggest that Part II-A is 
inconsistent with the rest of the opinion and 
unnecessary. I doubt that it is either. 
Ba r efoot submits that the Court of Appeals 
erroneously failed to reach the merits of his appeal 
and t hat we should r emand to permit the Court of 
Appeals to cure its error. In re sponse, the draft 
asserts t hat the Court of Appeals in f act reached and 
decided the merits; and in Part III the draft agrees 
with the Court of Appeals' and the District Court's 
view of the merits. If anything is unnecessary to 
decision in this case, which is here on certiorari 
before judgment, it is Part II-B. If four others 




in Navy terms, I shall stand by for 
Sincerely, 
Justice Stevens 





JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
.§nprtm.e QJqm-t of flrt ~b ;§htlts-
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June 7, 1983 
Re: 82-6080 - Barefoot v. Estelle 
Dear Byron: 
Thanks for your note. While you are standing by, 
I shall be doing the work of a yeoman. What I write 
will suggest that it is better practice to affirm a 
judgment than to allow the appeal to become moot by 
executing one of the litigants. 
Justice White 
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June 24, 1983 
No. 82-6080 
Barefoot v. Estelle 
Dear Thurgood, 
Please join me in your dissent. 
Sincerely, 
l 
( I l ' 
Justice Marshall 
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RE: Case No. 82-6080 - Barefoot v. Estelle 
Dear Byron: 
This will confirm my "join". 
lj 
Justice White 
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BRW for the Court 
1st draft 5/26/83 
2nd draft 6/13/83 
3rd draft 6/17/83 
4th draft 6/23/83 
5th draft 6/30/83 
Joined by CJ, LFP, WHR, SOC 
JPS concurring in the judgment 
TM dissent 
1st draft 6/23/83 
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HAB dissent 
Typed draft 6/29/83 
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